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Since the beginning of time, people have been plagued by the
reductionist temptation to understand the body only as that in which
they are enclosed—no more, no less. Due to technological progress,
prosthetics, ventilators, and organoids were later developed that
allowed a person to remedy flaws inherent in nature, and in some
cases to overcome the natural inequalities that resulted from genetic
or sexual development. This paper proposes a revolutionary
understanding of the body, based on a previously unknown five-part
theory of “bodiliness.” This theory allows for the granting of body
status, and similar protection for parts whose bodily status no one
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could label or imagine. This brand-new approach, as will be
illustrated, makes it possible to overcome things, such as, natural
inferiority, gender and sexual inequality, as well as bodily
discrimination.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 4th century B.C., the people of ancient Athens might have
witnessed a curious and even somewhat amusing phenomenon.
Diogenes of Sinope,1 known for his deeply philosophical antics,
wandered the streets of Athens – which had seen much – with a
lighted lantern in the middle of the day. Consequently, Diogenes
would reply to any onlookers that he was “looking for a man.” 2 The
purpose of this article is to find the correct concept of the human
body. Although this is a major feat, similar to Diogenes’ curiosity
during the 4th century, it must be done. However, we cannot be
silent, as such an obviousness is deceptive. The indisputable proof
of this can be found in the myriads of thick folios, stretching
unbroken through the millennia, and blindly reproducing a
particular view of the human body. This view is as old as the world
and has insignificantly changed over hundreds of years,
simultaneously, as the human body has imperceptibly changed and
evolved over time in the process of biological evolution. Past views
of the human body were generated by a mass of fused barbaric
prejudices and harmful stereotypes about human nature. 3 These
superstitions, being from their origin stillborn, have been
surprisingly well preserved and have survived up to current times
– embalmed with the formalin of traditionalism and conservatism.
1. Diogenes of Sinope (l. c. 404-323 BCE) was a Greek Cynic philosopher best
known for holding a lantern to the faces of the citizens of Athens claiming he
was searching for an honest man. See Joshua Mark, Diogenes of Sinope, WORLD
HIST. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Aug. 2, 2014) www.worldhistory.org/Diogenes_of_Sinope/
[https://perma.cc/GP5N-47FX] (noting that Diogenes rejected the concept of
“manners” as a lie and always advocated complete truthfulness under any
circumstances).
2. DIOGENES LAËRTIUS, LIVES OF THE EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS, at VI:41
(Robert Drew Hicks eds., Pamela Mensch trans., Loeb Classical Library ed.,
Harv. Univ. Press 1925) (2018).
3. For example, for a long time, the simple gender identity of being a female
deprived women of many social and political rights and patriarchal domination.
See Susan M. Cruea, Changing Ideals of Womanhood During the NineteenthCentury Woman Movement, 19 ATQ 187, 188-89 (2005) (writing on the history
of the movement for women’s rights). Also, such a natural trait of the human
body, such as the color of the skin, made one person the object of ownership (i.e.,
slave) and the other the owner thereof (slaveholder). See, e.g., Khushbu Shah &
Juweek Adolphe, 400 Years Since Slavery: A Timeline of American History, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2019), www.theguardian.com/news/2019/aug/15/400-yearssince-slavery-timeline [https://perma.cc/4ZZY-K44T] (describing in brief the
history of American slavery).
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There is no doubt that the described genealogy of the concept of the
human body requires a serious revision of the concept of the body.
This irreconcilable need is reinforced by the invaluable importance
that the concept of the human body has for research related to the
legal and social status of humans.
The concept of the human body is of fundamental and even
paradigmatic importance for law and legal research on major social
issues, such as race,4 gender5 and sexuality.6 The human body
4. In the context of racial studies, the notion of the body is important because
the human body, and the differences that may exist in people's bodies, are taken
as the basis for defining race. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF
INTEGRATION 157-79 (2010); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL
FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 110 (3rd ed. 2015); cf. Ekow N. Yankah,
Pretext and Justification: Republicanism, Policing, and Race, 40 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1543, 1573 (2019) (mentioning the body’s color as a cause for criminal
justice oppression against people of color); see also Bennett Capers, Policing,
Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 48, 72 (2009) (discussing
student body diversity as a compelling state interest that justified the use of
race in university admissions).
5. See Outlawing Trans Youth: State Legislatures and the Battle over
Gender-Affirming Healthcare for Minors, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2163, 2164 n.8
(2021) (mentioning the body as a central concept in the consideration of
transgender issues because the culmination of a transgender person’s exercise
of rights is to transition, which is defined as bringing the body into conformity
with gender identity), see also GEORGIANN DAVIS, CONTESTING INTERSEX: THE
DUBIOUS DIAGNOSIS 7-8 (2015) (explaining the attachment of gender to the body
in the context of intersexuality), e.g., Classification and Housing of Transgender
Inmates in American Prisons, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1746, 1757 (2014) (noting
gender identity is closely connected with body diversity), see Constitutional
Privacy and the Fight over Access to Sex-Segregated Spaces, 133 HARV. L. REV.
1684, 1693 (2020) (quoting lawsuits against transgender individuals based on
the failure to recognize their gender reassignment).
6. The concept of human sex is closely related to that of the body. See, e.g.,
Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 897 (2019)
(indicating that sex refers to bodily characteristics). It should be noted that
literature exploring women’s legal status (including feminist theory) often make
references to women’s bodies when criticizing the established patriarchal order.
See ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 130-32 (1983)
(discussing in Marxist terms women’s alienation from their own bodies);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 18990 (1989) (discussing how women were alienated from rights to their bodies,
which became owned by men); Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimination
and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105
HARV. L. REV. 80, 85 (Nov. 1991) (indicating that anti-abortion legislation can
be viewed as applying a communitarian approach to women's bodies); Michele
Goodwin, Women on the Frontlines, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 858 (2021)
(pointing to discrimination against women and particularly the exploitation of
black women’s bodies); Michele Goodwin & Erwin Chemerinsky, Pregnancy,
Poverty, and the State, 127 YALE L. J. 1270, 1278-79 (2018) (highlighting the
deprivation of the poor of bodily autonomy and, particularly, women of color, as
well as to the application of sterilization and eugenics to their bodies); Dorothy
E. Roberts, Critical Race Feminism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCe 112, 117-18 (Robin West & Cynthia Grant Bowman eds., 2019)
(arguing that in the United States the state has tried to regulate the bodies of
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serves as the starting point for the entire social and legal system of
coordinates, which addresses pressing social problems that are
painfully familiar to many members of our society. 7 Unfortunately,
contemporary studies of these kinds of problems ̶ however profound
and meaningful they may be for legal scholarship ̶ have devoted
remarkably little space to criticizing the old and developing a new
concept of the human body. Consequently, this nullifies or
significantly weakens the potential effect of research aimed at
breaking the foundations of the past. The past has hindered societal
achievement of social equality and inclusion. This futility of
attempts at social transformation is hardly surprising, for in the
absence of a logical new theory of bodiliness, many revolutionary
thinkers had to compromise, often without realizing it, with an old
view of the body that burdened rights like fetters and limited
individual freedom like a framework. This article aims to offer a
new theory of bodiliness, attempting to successfully start a body
revolution. Fundamental and radical changes must be made to
bring about a body revolution, all while being respectful of equality
and individual choice.
Part II of this article is devoted to the famous dichotomy
between natural and artificial body parts. The reader will learn
what criteria are decisive in answering the question of whether an
artificial, external object has really become part of a person. Also,
this section questions and explains why artificial body parts should
acquire the same status as natural body parts. Furthermore, this
section will show how an answer to this question will prevent
discrimination against people with disabilities. This approach will
give disabled persons an effective way of entering society on equal

black women for centuries).
7. Recently, there have been an influx of cases that have highlighted the
quintessence of social problems, relating to the human body. Thus, it will surely
become a textbook case of Henrietta Lacks, a black woman whose cells were
removed from her body without her consent, and by which the pharmaceutical
companies enriched themselves with billions of dollars. Now, her descendants,
represented by Ben Crump, who defended the interests of George Floyd’s family,
are suing in federal court in Baltimore against a company that skillfully took
advantage of the “racially unjust medical system.” See Emily Davies, 70 Years
Ago, Henrietta Lacks’s Cells Were Taken Without Consent. Now, Her Family
Wants Justice, THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 4, 2021), www.washingtonpost.
com/local/legal-issues/henrietta-lacks-family-sues-company/2021/10/04/
810ffa6c-2531-11ec-8831-a31e7b3de188_story.html
[perma.cc/C52F-7TEC]
(describing the lawsuit filed by representatives of Henrietta Lacks’ estate
against John Hopkins Hospital). In such a racially and materially sensitive
context, the question of rights in the body is hardly a product of idle curiosity.
See also Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y.
TIMES (May 31, 2020), www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floydinvestigation.html [perma.cc/MS6X-4PB5] (describing the infamous history of a
racial discrimination’s victim George Floyd, whose attorney Ben Crump now
advocates for Henrietta Lacks’ family).
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grounds with all other people – those lucky to be born without bodily
deviations.
Part III of this article demonstrates that the concept of the
body is not only limited to body parts that belong to a person from
birth or that are inextricably linked to their body. This article will
describe, from a comparative standpoint, the progressive theory of
the functional body (this theory, since its inception in Germany, has
been well ahead of the technological development of society). 8
Further, this paper depicts how the functional body theory has
provided a solid basis for granting “body status” to objects of the
material world (such as prosthetics) that, although not attached to
the human body, perform the functions inherent to each human
body.
Part IV will demonstrate that the functional body theory, while
being a serious step forward, is only a reflection of the slow
evolution of body perception, which cannot adequately respond to
the demands of the present time. In contrast to this understanding,
this article proposes a revolutionary view of the human body that
will guarantee the status of the human body to objects that,
typically, perform an abnormal and/or unusual function for an
individual– helping to overcome bodily inequalities created by
nature. In addition, no less legal protection will be given to those
objects that, although not currently performing a function
important to the human body, are potentially reserved for
performing it in the future. The new theory of bodiliness reaches its
apogee in the concept of reversible body, which is based on the
respect of the very will of person and allows the recognition as their
body even for those parts that were previously unwittingly
separated from them and attached to other persons. Finally, this
theory of bodiliness argues that one and the same body can be
inherent in several persons by virtue of the same or different
categories of bodiliness. Therefore, the new approach to the human
body makes it possible to protect, effectively on equal footing, all
persons who have a bodily interest in a certain body part.
Lastly, Part V establishes that a revolution in understanding
the human body also promotes a revolution in understanding
gender. This allows for a description of a person’s decisions about
their gender in bodily terms. Based on the new theory of bodiliness,
it becomes possible to recognize gender as part of the human body
by virtue of an attached bodiliness, and to confer the force of acts of
bodily self-determination on a person’s decision about their gender.
This paper argues that a bodily qualification of gender will provide
an unprecedented level of protection for transgender people. Lastly,

8. See infra notes 106-118 and accompanying text (highlighting the key
points of the German Supreme Court decision, which established the theory of
functional human body).
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this paper brings forth for the first time a dogmatic rationale for
why decisions about gender, made by gender-fluid people, should be
respected (despite their fluctuating expression of gender).

II. BOUNDARIES OF THE HUMAN BODY: DISMANTLING THE
NOTION OF HUMAN BODY PARTS
The human body is a highly complex biological organism that
evolved over time. Its evolution occurred even before the emergence
of complex social structures, the state, and science.9 From that time
to the present day, the human body has not undergone any major
changes that would be visible to the naked eye of a lawyer. 10 This
fundamental stability of the body is not something out of the
ordinary. Rather, it is fully in line with the natural course of things.
Typically, any evolutionary process is quite lengthy.11 As an
organism becomes more complex, the time required for its decisive
transformation increases.12 Due to these laws of nature, and up

9. Homo sapiens, which is anatomically identical to the phenotypes of
modern humans, and which is also referred to in science as “early modern
human” or “anatomically modern human”, is thought to have arisen
approximately 300,000 years ago. See Simon Neubauer et al., The Evolution of
Modern Human Brain Shape, 4 SCIENCE ADVANCES 1, 1-9 (Jan. 24, 2018)
(explaining the homo sapiens and the evolution of the human brain). See also
Aurélien Mounier & Marta M. Lahr, Deciphering African Late Middle
Pleistocene Hominin Diversity and the Origin of Our Species, 10 NATURE
COMMC’NS 1, 11 (Sep. 2019) (stating the last genetic common ancestral
population of all living humans may have lived more than 260,000 years ago);
Cf. Eleanor M.L. Scerri et al., Did Our Species Evolve in Subdivided Populations
across Africa, and Why Does It Matter?, 33 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION
582, 582-83 (2018) (discussing the recent change of view on the date of modern
homo sapiens’ origin).
10. Michael Greshko, These Early Humans Lived 300,000 Years Ago—But
Had Modern Faces, National Geographic (June 7, 2017), www.
nationalgeographic.com/history/article/morocco-early-human-fossilsanthropology-science [perma.cc/357Y-73DU] (writing that the face of homo
sapiens sample find more than 300 000 years ago is “the face of somebody you
could cross in the metro”).
11. But cf. How Long Does Evolution Take?, AM. MUSEUM OF NATURAL
HIST.,
www.amnh.org/exhibitions/darwin/evolution-today/how-long-doesevolution-take [perma.cc/C8WT-Q56W] (last visited May 27, 2022) (arguing
that some new species or varieties arise in a matter of years or even days).
12. When discussing the duration of human evolution related to adaptation
to the environment, we should pay attention to the case of the Bajau people
living in Southeast Asia, which, as far as can be judged, is one of the most recent
cases of evolution, see Melissa A. Ilardo et al., Physiological and Genetic
Adaptations to Diving in Sea Nomads, 173 CELL 569, 569-80 (2018) (noting that
it took its members at least a thousand years of swimming-focused life at sea to
adapt their bodies to unusually deep and long dives under water). See also Anna
Gislén et al., Superior Underwater Vision in a Human Population of Sea
Gypsies, 13 CURRENT BIOLOGY 833, 834 (May 13, 2003) (emphasizing “an
unusually strong diving reflex” of Bajau people in Philippines and Ama in Korea
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until recently, people were forced to live with the bodies that were
given to them, with no hope of changing them. 13 To compensate,
people tried to enhance their physical form through exercise. 14 But,
such a way of working with one's own body could not significantly
help one, especially if one was born with, or had acquired injuries to
the body that were considered irreversible. 15 Recently, however,
mankind has made a dramatic leap forward in terms of body-related
sciences, namely, modern technological advances in biology, 16
physics17 and chemistry.18 This progress allows humans to create
their body on par with nature, 19 and overcome the limits of the
body’s own generic and individual nature. Artificial body parts, such
as devices, mechanisms and equipment, that have been created
and Japan), see Iman Hamid et al., Rapid Adaptation to Malaria Facilitated by
Admixture in the Human Population of Cabo Verde, 10 ELIFE 1, 1 (Jan. 4, 2021),
www. doi.org/10.7554/eLife.63177 (reporting that it took at least 20 generations
for Cape Verdean people to acquire resistance to malaria). These studies
support the thesis that human evolution, at least in a limited way, can occur
relatively quickly. However, the word “relatively” is the key word, since 1000
years or 20 generations is hardly a fast evolutionary timeframe when viewed
from the perspective of a single human life.
13. See generally James Chambers & Peter Ray, Achieving Growth and
Excellence in Medicine, 63 ANNALS OF PLASTIC SURGERY 473, 473-78 (Nov.
2009) (discussing the development of modern anatomical surgery).
14. See, e.g., Lucas Caldas et al., Multicomponent exercise training is effective
in improving health and behavior indicators in Brazilian elderly women: A nonrandomized trial, 29 J. OF BODYWORK AND MOVEMENT THERAPIES 40, 40 (Jan.
2022) (highlighting the improvement of bodily physical characteristics and
aging slowdown in the selected group of Brazilian elderly women).
15. Physical exercises have a therapeutic effect only in respect of some
common injuries such as muscle pull and strain, wrist sprain etc. See Jesse
Lieberman,
Therapeutic
Exercise,
MEDSCAPE
(Nov.
29,
2018),
https://emedicine.medscape.com/article/324583-overview [perma.cc/75GFXRR8] (describing physiologic aspects of physical exercises treatment).
16. See generally Rajani Singh et al., Will Development of Human Anatomy
Revolutionize Medical Education?, 34 The FASEB J. 1,1 (Apr. 17, 2020) (stating
that the development of human anatomy sciences may lead to a better
understanding of the human body structure, and to an improvement of medical
education).
17. Physical sciences provided a great basis for understanding the human
body mechanism. See Emily Willingham, New Brain Implant Transmits Full
Words
from
Neural
Signals,
SCI.
AM.
(July
15,
2021),
www.scientificamerican.com/article/new-brain-implant-transmits-full-wordsfrom-neural-signals/ [perma.cc/TWK5-V8FR] (reporting the invention of
mechanism able to translate human brain neural signals into understandable
words).
18. See generally Mihaela Pertea, The Human Transcriptome: An
Unfinished Story, 3 GENES 344, 344-60 (June 29, 2012) (reporting the
development in the realm of human DNA transcription, which clarifies the
bodily structure on the chemical level).
19. See Human–Robotic Interfaces to Shape the Future of Prosthetics, 46
EBIOMEDICINE 1, 1 (2019) (arguing, among other things, that due to human–
robotic interfaces, bionic body parts, and cutting-edge medicine, humans of the
future are imagined to be capable of easily recovering from very severe injuries).
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outside the human body – but have been attached to the body to
become its part20 – have been the key role in changing the
characteristics of the human body.21 The law must scrutinize and
define the legal statuses of artificial body parts and the evolving
body revolution,22 particularly, in light of increasing complexity of
the human body.23

A. Natural Body Parts and Artificial Body Parts:
Illusive Distinction
The guiding principle in determining the legal status of
artificial body parts is the degree of attachment – the strength of
the connection between the artificial part and the human body. 24
For instance, there is a widespread belief that devices which are not
incorporated into the body organically, but instead can be easily
removed from the human body, do not become the human body. 25
Such artificial parts are separable from the body, and so even if they

20. This definition avoids indicating the purpose of using artificial parts as
restoration of the lost part, although, historically, this was the purpose for
which prostheses were created and used. See DAVID T. MITCHELL & SHARON L.
SNYDER, NARRATIVE PROSTHESIS: DISABILITY AND THE DEPENDENCIES OF
DISCOURSE 6-7 (2000). Cf. generally KATHERINE OTT ET AL., ARTIFICIAL PARTS,
PRACTICAL LIVES: MODERN HISTORY OF PROSTHETICS (KATHERINE OTT ET AL.
EDS., 2002) (arguing that in the past, this forced, and thus limited, use of
prosthetics was justified because the technology of the past allowed only
complex and uncomfortable artificial body parts), but see DAVID WILLS,
PROSTHESIS 141 (1995) (averring that in the present and future, body
prosthetics will not be the exception, but rather the new paradigm of the body).
21. See generally EMMA HUDDLESTONE, PROSTHETICS: ENGINEERING THE
HUMAN BODY 1 (2019) (emphasizing the high and invaluable importance of
prosthetics for the enhancement of human body).
22. The biotechnology revolution obviously also presupposes a fundamental
reconsideration of the view on the human body. Cf. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR
POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION
7 (2003) (claiming that the biotechnology revolution is fraught with “the
possibility that it will alter human nature and thereby move us into a
'posthuman' stage of history”).
23. See Marie Fox, What is Special about the Human Body?, 7 L.,
INNOVATION & TECH. 206, 210 (2015) (concluding that in the context of new
prosthetic technologies, the former concept of the body, naturalistic and limited,
must give way to a new, more complex concept). For an example of the new body
concept, see Gowri Ramachandran, Assault and Battery on Property, 44 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 253, 256 (2010) (considering the speculative example of the
smartphone as a human exo-brain).
24. See, e.g., HELMUT HEINRICHS IN: PALANDT BGB, 53rd ed. 1994, § 90
recital 3 (Ger.) (arguing that objects not firmly attached to the human body shall
be deemed to be its parts).
25. Such an approach found many proponents among the scholars and
judges. See GERHARD RING IN: NK-BGB, 4th ed. 2021, § 90 recital 26 (Ger.)
(concerning dentures). See also Amtsgericht [AG] Koblenz, 1990 Zeitschrift für
Schadensrecht [ZfS] 339 (Ger.) (regarding wooden legs).
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have not been actually separated from it, they retain their
proprietary status and continue to belong to the person who had
ownership of them before they were attached to the body.26 If an
artificial part has been permanently attached to or implanted into
the human body, the artificial part then becomes a part of the body
and loses its proprietary status, sharing the legal fate of the human
body.27 There is the belief that an object permanently attached to a
body changes its status. However, this belief can be viewed in the
light that right of appropriation of implants implanted in the
human body after someone’s death is not granted to that
26. 1 PAUL-HENRI STEINAUER, LES DROITS RÉELS 57 (5th ed. 2012) (Switz.),
1 HEINZ REY, DIE GRUNDLAGEN DES SACHENRECHTS UND DAS EIGENTUM 26
(3rd ed. 2007); see also ARTHUR MEIER-HAYOZ, BERNER KOMMENTAR, 1981,
ZGB § 641 at 73 (Switz.) (stating that unseparated wooden legs are property,
not body); see OLIVER KÄLIN, DER SACHBEGRIFF IM SCHWEIZERISCHEN ZGB 106
(2002) (Switz.) (regarding wooden legs and other separable prostheses).
27. JÜRGEN ELLENBERGER IN: PALANDT BGB, 80th ed. 2021, § 90 recital 3
(Ger.); ERWIN DEUTSCH & ANDREAS SPICKHOFF, MEDIZINRECHT, at recital 618
(7th ed. 2014) (Ger.); see also Landgericht [LG] Mainz, 1984 MedR 199, 200
(Ger.) (concerning implanted pacemaker); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] Bamberg,
2008 NJW 1543, 1544 (Ger.) (concerning implanted golden teeth and quoting in
favor of its approach Karlhans Dippel in: StGB. Leipziger Kommentar, 12th ed.
2009, § 168 recital 37 (Ger.)), Cf. also Adolf Laufs & Emil Reiling,
Schmerzensgeld wegen schuldhafter Vernichtung deponierten Spermas? 1994
NJW 775, 775-6 (Ger.) (averring that only those objects that stand in complete
unity with the human body, shall be conceived of as human body).
In France, the same position is taken by Cass. 1re civ., Dec. 11, 1985, Bull.
civ. I, no. 348 (regarding dental prosthesis), see also TGI Lille, Apr. 21, 1981,
Gazette du Palais, 1983, No. 205, note X. Labbée (concerning dental prosthesis
and stating that “les objets non encore intégrés à la personne de ceux qui,
comme les prothèses médicales, font partie intégrante de la personnalité de
l’individu dès lors qu’ils sont posés” [objects not yet inserted into the human
body, like medical prostheses, do not form part of a person's identity until they
are inserted]). See CA Douai, Mar. 20, 1985, Juris-Classeur Périodique, 1985,
20: 365 (noting that implanted prosthesis follow the nature of human body via
accessorium sequitur principale rule). Also, in France, the prosthesis is
designated as personne par destination [part of a person by virtue of its
destination]. Xavier Labbée, L'Homme Robotisé, in L'HUMAIN ET ES
PROTHÈSES: SAVOIRS ET PRATIQUES DU CORPS TRANSFORMÉ [ONLINE] at para.
9 (CNRS Éditions 2017) (Apr. 21, 2021, 10:31 a.m.) (Fr.).
The same position prevails in the Netherlands. Vraag en Antwoord,
Eigendomsrechten van een Patient op Lichaamsdelen en Vreemde Voorwerpen,
23 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR GENEESKUNDE 973, 973-74 (1970). See also
Viviane Missoul, Eigendom en Hergebruik van Kunstmatige Organen, 49 JURA
FALCONIS 242, 245 (1985) (arguing that human body and accessories implanted
into it, are excluded from the patrimonial sphere, quoting Josephus Maeijer,
Transplanteren van Organen en het Privaatrecht, 6 Tijdschrift voor
Privaatrecht 153, 156 (1969)); Bernhard Sluyters, De Pacemaker en het Recht,
9 METAMEDICA 317, 317-78 (1982) (concerning implanted and unseparated
pacemaker).
The concept of personne par destination also occurs in Switzerland, see 1
STEINAUER, supra note 26, § 67 at 28 (mentioning implanted external dentures,
dental fillings, pacemakers).
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individual’s heirs,28 rather the appropriation of an implant is
granted to close relatives of the deceased individual. 29 Ordinarily,
the property belonging to the deceased (including implants, if
qualified as property) is to be transferred to its heirs.30 So, if, at the
time the artificial body parts were attached to the human body, they
did not change their (proprietary) status, then there would be no
reason not to transfer them, among other assets of the deceased, to
the heirs.
Some authors in the literature maintain a dubious view that a
strong connection between the artificial part and the body, itself, is
not necessary for qualifying the attachment as part of the body. 31
This means that even if the attached object can be separated from
the body without much difficulty, it will be recognized as a body. 32
It is difficult to agree with such a position, as it fundamentally
contradicts the very concept of an artificial bodily part. An artificial
body part, by its phraseology and substance, implies attachment to
the body, creating a single organism. In our understanding, the
general rule should be that an object, being a foreign entity in
relation to the body, cannot become part of the body until it is built
into it.
Another criterion for whether an object becomes an artificial
part of the body that is rarely discussed is the function that the
artificial part performs.33 In Germany, it is possible to encounter

28. DIETMAR WEIDLICH IN: PALANDT BGB, 80th ed. 2021, § 1922 recital 37
(Ger.); Wilhelm Weimar, Zum Aneignungsrecht am Herzschrittmacher des
Erblassers, 1979 JURISTISCHE RUNDSCHAU [JR] 363, 364, contra KARL-HEINZ
GURSKY IN: STAUDINGER BGB, Neubearb. ed. 2011, § 958 recital 4 (Ger.);
JÜRGEN ELLENBERGER IN: PALANDT BGB, 71st ed., § 90 recital 11 (Ger.); AXEL
STEIN IN: SOERGEL BGB, 13th ed., § 1922 recital 22 (Ger.).
29. LUDWIG ENNECCERUS & HANS CARL NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL
DES BÜRGERLICHEN RECHTS, at § 121 II 1 (15th ed. 1959) (noting that, being
implants property of the deceased, it would be inherited by its heirs); cf. OLG
München, 1976 NJW 1805 (Ger.) (stating that human body of the deceased, in
contrast to property, is not subject to inheritance procedure); JOACHIM JICKELI
& MALTE STIEPER IN: STAUDINGER BGB, Neubearb ed. 2012, § 90 recital 49
(Ger.) (arguing that human body is not property and no person has right of
ownership in its body).
30. Bernhard Goergens, Künstliche Teile im menschlichen Körper, 1980 JR
140, 141-3; KLAUS VIEWEG IN: JURIS PRAXISKOMMENTAR BGB [JURISPK-BGB],
9th ed. 2020, § 90 recital 15 (Ger.)
31. See Roger Nerson, Les Droits Extrapatrimoniaux 131 (1939) (PhD
dissertation) (on file with the Université de Lyon); Xavier Dijon, Le Sujet de
Droit en son Corps: Une Mise à l'Épreuve du Droit Subjectif § 986 (1982) (PhD
dissertation) (on file with the Université de Namur). See also Aurel David,
Réflexions pour un Schéma de l'Homme, 7 APD 103 (1959); Aurel David, Les
Biens et Leur Évolution, 7 APD 165 (1963) (stating in each paper that this
approach is most suitable for the goals of modern transplantology).
32. Nerson, supra note 31, at 131; Dijon, supra note 31, at § 986.
33. JOACHIM KRETSCHMER IN: ANWALTKOMMENTAR STGB, 2011, § 242
recital 16 (Ger.).
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the belief (present in literature) that not only a strong and firm
connection of a thing with the body is required to be recognized as
an artificial part, but also a function of replacing an organ of the
human body.34 Generally, the definition of artificial body parts
exclude supplementary implants, as such implants merely
supplement, or support, the existing body part (SupportivImplantate),35 which may include implants such as pacemakers. A
more correct and prevailing position in the literature is one that
rejects the ridiculous division into supporting and replacing a body
organ and instead qualifies both supporting and replacing implants
as part of the body.36
It seems that both viewpoints suffer from the same flaw: a lack
of understanding of the nature of the human body. Such dogmatism
translates an outdated teleological and mechanistic paradigm, in
which everything in the human body must necessarily have a
specific useful (and, in the case of the replacement theory,
irreplaceably useful) function.37 However, this is wrong both from
the perspective of biology, which is familiar with useless body parts
(e.g., ear muscles),38 and from the perspective of law, which seeks to
provide the greatest possible level of protection to each individual
(particularly an individual’s choice regarding their own body). 39
Whatever is attached to a person’s body by virtue of their own free
will must be recognized, without further requirement, as a human
body, for it is an act of bodily self-expression.40 Such logic
corresponds to the current realities, where many non-functional
aesthetic prostheses are just as popular as active prostheses. 41
34. Christoph Safferling & Simon Menz, Sonderbare Vorkommnisse im
Krematorium, 2008 JURA 382, 383 (Ger.).
35. NIKOLAUS BOSCH IN: SCHÖNKE/SCHRÖDER STGB, 30th ed. 2019, § 242
recital 10 (Ger.); Hans-Friedrich Brandenburg, Wem Gehört der
Herzschrittmacher? 1984 JUS 47 (Ger.); Goergens, supra note 30, at 141.
36. Gunnar Duttge in: Dölling/Duttge/Rössner StGB, 3rd ed. 2013, § 242
recital 8 (Ger.).
37. Kretschmer, supra note 33, at § 242 recital 16.
38. See Willet Rotzell, Some Vestigial Structures in Man, 72 Scientific Am.
375, 375 (1895) (qualifying ear muscles as atavism).
39. See Arseny Shevelev & Georgy Shevelev, Proprietary Status of the Whole
Body of a Living Person, 86 RabelsZ (forthcoming October 2022) (on file with
authors) (explaining, with reference to supporting authorities, that the law
shall grant the individual’s choice in respect of their own body at the highest
level as possible).
40. A well-known case of self-expression are bodypiercings, which is quite
common in society. However, if tattoos are sometimes prohibited in some
legislation, then piercings will share the same fate there. See TGI Paris, June
3, 1969, D. 70 (Fr.) (prohibiting the transaction of tattooing as that which uses
the body as the object of a contract). See also Anne Fagot-Largeault, Ownership
of the Human Body: Judicial and Legislative Responses in France, in Ownership
of the Human Body 116 (Jos V.M. Welie & Henk A.M.J. ten Have eds., 1998)
(Neth.) (discussing the oddness of the TGI Paris, June 3, 1969, D. 70 decision).
41. See Claire Fraser, An Evaluation of the Use Made of Cosmetic and
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Studies show that many people feel incomplete in the absence of a
cosmetic prosthesis,42 as if a part of their body had been taken
away.43 Thus the disfigurement becomes a serious obstacle to
making new social contacts.44 In other words, it is precisely an
aesthetic prosthesis that makes people with disfigurement feel as if
their body is complete.45 In such situations, the socio-political
Functional Prostheses by Unilateral Upper Limb Amputees, 22 Prosthetic and
Orthotic Int’l 216, 216 (1998) (emphasizing that non-manipulative prostheses
are used as actively as functional ones), Cf. Bartjan Maat et al., Passive
Prosthetic Hands and Tools: A Literature Review, 42 Prosthetic and Orthotics
Int’l 66, 67 (2018) (noting that despite the underdeveloped nature of passive
prostheses, in relation to active ones, many people though continue to use
them). See Prosthesis, Am. Cancer Soc’y, www.cancer.org/treatment/
treatments-and-side-effects/physical-side-effects/prostheses.html
[perma.cc/
VR6V-G5J2] (reporting the popularity of aesthetic prostheses used instead of
natural limbs lost due to cancer); Reconstruction Mammaire, Institut National
du Cancer, www.e-cancer.fr/Patients-et-proches/Les-cancers/Cancer-du-sein/
Reconstruction-mammaire [perma.cc/2HRZ-HXDA] (last visited Feb. 6, 2022,
1:52 AM) (noting the high demand on aesthetic prostheses in case of
mastectomy due to cancer).
42. See Cosmetic Prostheses for People with Limb Loss, The Australian
Orthotic Prosthetic Ass’n, www.aopa.org.au/documents/item/724 [perma.cc/
BXU3-XN4E] (last visited May 28, 2022, 2:03 PM) (describing cosmetic
prostheses including, among others, replacing limbs, hands and feet, facial or
breast prostheses, and internal prostheses such as joint replacements).
43. See DAVID HARRIS, Types, Causes and Physical Treatment of Visible
Differences, VISIBLY DIFFERENT: COPING WITH DISFIGUREMENT 79, 81 (1997)
(accenting a high level of stress and dissatisfaction). See also Tom Millard &
Lynn Richman, Different Cleft Conditions, 38 CLEFT PALATE CRANIOFACIAL J.
68, 70 (2001) (reporting that cleft-affected children are more at risk than their
non-cleft peers for elevated anxiety, general unhappiness, and self-doubt). See
Samantha Turner et al., Psychological Outcomes amongst Cleft Patients and
their Families, 50 BRIT. J. PLASTIC SURGERY 1, 7 (1997) (finding that 73% of
their sample felt their self-confidence had been very much affected by their
cleft). Moreover, cleft is sometimes likely to cause people commit a suicide. See
ANTONY HERSKIND ET AL., Cleft Lip: A Risk Factor for Suicide, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE ABSTRACT OF THE SEVENTH INT’L CONGRESS ON CLEFT PALATE AND
RELATED CRANIOFACIAL ANOMALIES 156 (1993) (reporting a doubled suicide
rate amongst Danish adults with clefts).
44. See Nichola Rumsey & Diana Harcourt, Body Image and Disfigurement:
Issues and Interventions, 1 BODY IMAGE 83, 83-84 (2004) (highlighting that a
visible difference comprises a “social disability,” since the body defects are likely
to be noticed by other people), see also Turner et al., supra note 43, at 8-9
(writing that in 60% of cases people with disfigurements experience difficulties
in making social contact because they are perceived as imperfect by their
interlocutors), Emma Robinson, Psychological Research on Visible Differences
in Adults, VISIBLY DIFFERENT: COPING WITH DISFIGUREMENT 102-11 (Ronald
Lansdown et al. eds. 1997) (reporting difficulties relating to meeting new people,
making new friends, and the resulting concerns about developing longer term
relationships).
45. See Burcu Burçak et al., Quality of Life, Body Image, and Mobility in
Lower-Limb Amputees Using High-Tech Prostheses: A Pragmatic Trial, 64
ANNALS OF PHYSICAL AND REHAB. MED., 1, 5 (2021) (stating that aesthetic
prostheses improve the body image of a person and lead to its satisfaction);
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context demands that non-functional cosmetic implants be
recognized as having a similar status to their active counterparts. 46
Not recognizing passive prostheses, such as an artificial eye, arm,
or finger, implanted for beauty purposes as a human body,
contradicts the social expectations of both the person with
disfigurements and others who perceive them. Both categories of
persons (people with or without malformations) perceive this
implant as a natural body part, and the law cannot ignore their
intrinsic expectations. Accordingly, there is a sole duplex
requirement for implants to be recognized as a body part, consisting
of subjective and objective elements (a person’s will). 47 In turn, a
narrow understanding of artificial body parts can deprive an
individual of essential legal means provided by law for the
protection and redress of violated rights to the body. 48
The recognition of an object as an artificial body part entails
the most important consequences of a civil and criminal law nature.
In criminal law, it should be noted that an encroachment on
attached artificial body parts would be considered an encroachment
on the body, and the harm caused to it would be an injury to
health,49 not harm to property.50 From a civil law perspective,
Nicola Cairns et al., Satisfaction with Cosmesis and Priorities for Cosmesis

Design Reported by Lower Limb Amputees in the United Kingdom: Instrument
Development and Results, 38 PROSTHETIC AND ORTHOTICS INT’L 467, 468-69
(2014) (stating in respect of prostheses that satisfaction is associated with the
individual’s body image), cf. Susan Roberts et al., External Breast Prosthesis

Use: Experiences and Views of Women with Breast Cancer, Breast Care Nurses,
and Prosthesis Fitters, 26 CANCER NURSING 179, 180 (2003) (noting that women

that have undergone mastectomy and implanted artificial breast felt that they
maintained their femininity, normality, and body image and that breast
prosthesis improved the quality of their life); Simone Glaus & Grant Carlson,
Long Term Role of External Breast Prostheses after Total Mastectomy, 15
BREAST J. 385, 390 (2009) (reporting that satisfaction level remained high in
those women who used an artificial breast rather than in ones not following the
same course of action).
46. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
47. An act of self-determination (subjective criterion), and the quality of
permanent attachment of implant to the human body (objective criterion).
48. See infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Oscar
Pistorius case).
49. See BRIGITTE TAG, DER KÖRPERVERLETZUNGSTATBESTAND IM
SPANNUNGSFELD ZWISCHEN PATIENTENAUTONOMIE UND LEX ARTIS. EINE
ARZTSTRAFRECHTLICHE UNTERSUCHUNG 119-21 (2000) (equating the harm to
an attached artificial body part to the bodily injury), see also Bernhard
Hardtung, Die Körperverletzungsdelikte, 2008 JuS 864, 864 (Ger.) (explaining
that harm to a pacemaker is characterized as an injury to health), e.g., CA Aixen-Provence, Oct. 1, 2015, No. 14/12662 (Fr.) (stating that the destruction of a
hearing aid is the destruction of a prosthesis that forms part of a person, and
therefore this crime is a crime against a person (préjudice corporel) and not
property).
50. Some courts look more broadly at the concept of property and qualify as
theft the removal of a gold tooth from a human body. See Hoge Raad, 25 juni
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artificial body parts are subject to a privilege that is difficult to
overstate. Once something has been attached to the body it is
excluded from the circle of objects that can be foreclosed, due to the
termination of ownership in the attached object.51 A foreclosure on
the objects attached to the human body would look completely
inconceivable and absurd.52 However, there are cases supporting
this. Some courts, contrary to common sense, formally and rigidly
applying the rules of the current legislation, 53 allowed the recovery
of dentures directly from the jaw of the patient. 54 However, cases of
this kind should be distinguished from cases involving the recovery
of dentures which have not been embedded in the person. In such a
case, the dentures do not become part of the person, rather they
remain property;55 Therefore, they do not enjoy the immunity that
law grants to the human body.56 The problems with the proper

1946, N.J., 1946, 503 (deciding with respect to a dead body, but the basic thesis
of the decision fits the living body: what is not property under civil law can still
be the subject of theft). Cf. Cass. crim., Oct. 25, 2000, No. 00-82.152 (Fr.)
(holding that dentures were the property of the wearer before their death and,
after that moment, the property of their heirs, and could be the subject of theft).
See also Thierry Garé, Les Objets Laissés dans une Sépulture ne sont pas
Abandonnés, 13 D. 1052, 1053 (2001) (quoting Cass. crim., Oct. 25, 2000, No.
00-82.152 and adhering to its approach).
51. In France, the recovery of dentures for debt has repeatedly been refused
on the grounds that they are part of the person, see supra note 27 and
accompanying text (discussing the French case law following this approach). In
the same spirit is the doctrine in the Netherlands, which denies a person whose
organs have been transplanted into another person (and were, in that sense,
artificial to the recipient) the right to recover them due to termination of
ownership of the donor in them. Erna Guldix, De Impact van de Medische
Wetenschap en Techniek op bet Personen- en Gezinsrecbt, 57 RECHTSKUNDIG
WEEKBLAD 1113 (1993-94); 1 Henricus J.J. Leenen et al, Handboek
Gezondheidsrecht. Rechten van Mensen in de Gezondheidszorg 49 (2007);
Herman Nys, Eigendom in het Medisch Recht, RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 2357,
2371 (1984).
52. See, e.g., Genrichus C.J.M. Hamilton van Helst, De eigendom van
Bartstimulatoren,
een
Probleemverkenning,
4
TIJDSCHRIFT
VOOR
GEZONDHEIDSRECHT 186, 192 (1983) (Neth.) (concluding personal rights
prevailed over an implanted pacemaker).
53. Code de Procedure Civil Article L.511-1 (Fr.) (allowing retention of
property belonging to a debtor to secure the debt and to induce the proper
performance of obligation).
54. See CA Douai, Oct. 14, 1983, JCP 1985.II.20365, obs. X. LABBEE; Nov.
16, 1983, RTD Civ. 1985.454, obs. R. PERROT (Fr.) (allowing saisie
conservatoire [retention of a thing to secure payment of a debt] of a prosthesis
in a patient's mouth).
55. See TGI Lille, Apr. 21, 1981, Gazette du Palais 1983, 2, 416, note Ph.
BERTIN (Fr.) (allowing a dentist to foreclose an unpaid and uninserted
denture).
56. Some, however, extend immunity from recovery not only to what is truly
an artificial part of the human body, but also to assistive devices. See Sylvie
Cimamonti, L'Effectivité des Droits du Créancier Chirographaire en Droit
Contemporain 547 (1990) (PhD dissertation) (on file with the Université d'Aix-
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qualification of actions performed in relation to artificial body parts,
as well as the situations in which these actions are performed, are
due to the difficulty of correct and precise definitions of the legal
status of the artificial part. The true definition of artificial body part
status should reflect the balance of conflicting interests of
proprietary and personal nature belonging to different persons.
Artificial body parts, from the moment they are incorporated
into the body, must be regulated in the same way as natural body
parts.57 Until then, artificial body parts, being ordinary things,58 are
subject to general rules of applicable property law. The transition of
an object from the status of a “thing” to the status of an “artificial
body part” does not, in itself, cause problems. But, problems arise
when such a part (e.g., implant) belongs to a person other than the
one of which it will become a part. 59 Does the fact that the implant
became part of the person mean that the proprietary interest of the
person to whom it belonged is irrevocably and irreversibly lost? The
complete destruction of a third party’s pecuniary interest, due to the
transformation of their own implant into a part of another person's
body, should clearly not be in the third party's interest. This is
especially noticeable in situations where the implant is made of a
valuable metal (such as gold), which can be put back into economic
circulation, and the person in whom the implant was embedded is
deceased.60 To protect the uncompensated interest of the implant
Marseille III) (arguing foreclosure may not be imposed upon glasses, contact
lenses and hearing devices). See also CA Paris, June 19, 2020, No. 18/03104
(finding plaintiff was correctly denied recognition of the glasses breakage as an
accident at work, due to lack of bodily injury).
57. This rule should be applied even in the most convoluted and contentious
situations. Thus, the question posed by Xavier Labbée, La Gueule de l'Autre, 12
D. 801, 801-2 (2006) (Fr.), whether the commitment of a crime by a person to
whom the face of another deceased person has been transplanted (and that face
has become a person’s prosthesis) is capable of injuring the dignity of the
deceased and the feelings of their relatives, we would answer in the negative.
We answer like this because to that person, the rules of the natural person
should apply, whose commission of the crime has not, at this time, injured the
dignity of persons other than the offender themselves.
58. It should be remembered that some artificial parts may be special and
regulated accordingly in a special way. See Sara Gerke, Die Klinische
Translation von hiPS-Zellen in Deutschland, in DIE KLINISCHE ANWENDUNG
VON HUMANEN INDUZIERTEN PLURIPOTENTEN STAMMZELLEN 243, 291 (Sara
Gerke et al. eds, 2020) (Austria) (stating that artificially created organs made
from organic material are subject to the same restrictions imposed by
transplant laws (including those related to trade) as naturally obtained organs);
Christian Kopetzki et al., Die Klinische Translation von hiPS-Zellen in
Österreich, in DIE KLINISCHE ANWENDUNG VON HUMANEN INDUZIERTEN
PLURIPOTENTEN STAMMZELLEN 329, 362-3 (Sara Gerke et al. eds., 2020)
(Austria).
59. Exemplifying may be a case of prosthesis theft when a thief incorporates
the stolen implant into one’s own body.
60. See, e.g., Hoge Raad, June 25, 1946, N.J., 1946, 503 (Neth.) (holding the
unauthorized removal of gold teeth from the body of the deceased as a crime of
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owner, many individuals suggest that the moment an implant is
incorporated in a person should not affect the third party’s
proprietary right. This proprietary right, according to their view,
should continue in effect, and be restored in full from the moment
the implant ceases to be part of a living person's body.61 Others
propose to leave aside the determination of the legal status of the
implant until the death of the bearer, since the determination of the
status during this period is “debatable.” 62 Concurrently, individuals
claim to recognize that, upon the death of the person, implants
automatically become separate objects,63 which opens the possibility
for a third party to regain ownership. Such escapism, which should
hardly be welcomed, once again proves that the existing old problem
requires a new solution.
The essence of the previous solutions was that the ownership
in the artificial part attached to the human body did not disappear,
but merely “fell asleep” and was awakened when the artificial part
became property again. The preservation of ownership for the time
of attachment to the person was a logically necessary and
unavoidable step, because otherwise it would be impossible to
consistently and coherently explain why a third party would have
ownership in another person’s detached body part (even if it were
artificial). This third party (former owner of an object implanted
into another person) would be as alien, in respect of the separated
body part, as any seller in respect to the thing sold. The unfortunate
result of such theoretical constructions was the breaking of the
holistic conception of human: human beings transformed into a set
of parts that were subject to fundamentally different rights. 64
Another evident problem of past theories is slavery, in which an
individual would become, albeit in part, under ownership of
another. This directly contradicts human dignity and the values of
modern civil society.
The solution proposed is the concept of abstract ownership in
an artificial body part. We have already debunked existing views on
body ownership in our article in a leading European journal, Rabels
Zeitschrift, providing an extensive comparative analysis of previous
theories and offering (to the best of our knowledge, for the first time)
theft).
61. See, e.g., Peter Bringewat, Die Wiederverwendung von
Herzschrittmachern, 1984 JA 61, 63 (Ger.) (providing justification for this
approach); Bernd-Rüdeger Sonnen, Der Diebstahl nach § 242 StGB, 1984 JA
569, 570-1 (Ger.).
62. Matthias Jahn & Markus Ebner, Fortgeschrittenenklausur - Strafrecht:
Nürnberger Zahngold, 2008 JuS 1086, 1087 (Ger.).
63. Id.
64. See Joachim Kretschmer, Das Tatbestandsmerkmal “Sache” im
Strafrecht, 2015 JA 105, 108 (Ger.) [hereinafter Kretschmer, Sache] (noting the
discrepancy between the theory of ownership in bodily parts and the holistic
concept of the human being).
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a brand new and dogmatically coherent justification of ownership
in human body.65 A new dogma was named an abstract ownership
in the human body. An abstract right can be understood as a
proprietary right, extending directly to an abstract object. 66 All
phenomena would only be a concretization 67 of this abstract object
(which will not cease to exist even when its concretization changes).
Replacement of the concretization of the abstract object does not
change the very right that extends to the object.68 The abstractness
of the object allows one to exclude the recognition of a living person
as a concrete object of ownership.69 But, at the same time, the
abstractness of the object does not detract from the very existence
of ownership, and even allows us to make dispositions of ownership.
Subsequently, the peculiarity of abstract ownership in this case is

65. See Shevelev & Shevelev, supra note 39.
66. It may seem that if a right extends to an abstract object rather than to a
thing, then it is not real (proprietary). However, the right should not extend to
a thing, because it is a phenomenon of an ideal order, so the object must also be
ideal, not material. The proprietary (real) character of the right extending to an
abstract object is not lost if “realism of notions” (Begriffsrealismus) is admitted,
as suggested by Sokolowski. PAUL VON SOKOLOWSKI, DIE PHILOSOPHIE IM
PRIVATRECHT: SACHBEGRIFF UND KÖRPER IN DER KLASSISCHEN JURISPRUDENZ
UND DER MODERNEN GESETZGEBUNG 400 (1902) (Ger.).
67. The concretization of the abstract object of the proprietary right is very
similar in meaning and sound to the Scottish institution of attachment, through
which the floating charge, which does not apply to a particular thing, was
“attached” and became a fixed charge when the debtor was in default. See
Alisdair McPherson, The Attachment of the Floating Charge in Scots Law 22
(2017) (PhD dissertation) (on file with the University of Edinburgh) (explaining
the essence of attachment as a moment and process); Nat’l Com. Bank of Scot.
v. Liquidator of Telford, Grier Mackay & Co. Ltd. 1969 SLT 306, 313 (Scot.).
68. The change in the concretization of an object, which preserves the right
that extends to an abstract object, is very similar to the institution of
proprietary surrogation (dingliche Surrogation), with the difference however
that proprietary surrogation replaces one thing with another, relying on the fact
that the new thing has been acquired at the expense of the old, , see Oberster
Gerichtshof [OGH] 8Ob139/07k (Austria) (defining the notion of proprietary
surrogation). See also BERNHARD ECCHER IN: ABGB PRAXISKOMMENTAR,
Michael Schwimann ed., 3rd ed. 2005, § 613 recital 3 (explaining that
proprietary surrogation has long been applied in this form in Austrian
inheritance law and quoting Supreme Court decisions OGH SZ 41/136 and OGH
2 Ob 631/86). Thus, in the case of proprietary surrogation, many things may
substitute the place of a perished thing as an object of right. See, e.g., ANDREAS
KLETECKA, ERSATZ- UND NACHERBSCHAFT 305 (1999) (Austria) (concerning
insurance compensation); and JAN LIEDER IN: MÜKOBGB, 8th ed. 2020, § 1127
recital 1 (Ger.). See also EGON WEIß IN: KLANG ABGB III, 2nd ed., at 407, 41920 (Austria) (regarding compensation for expropriation); and CHRISTOPH
SCHÄRTL IN: BECKOK BGB, 57th ed. 2021, § 1212 recital 5 (Ger.) (regarding
proceeds from the sale of collateral). The doctrine of proprietary surrogation has
no sound dogmatic justification, unlike the one proposed in the RabelsZ paper.
On the weaknesses of proprietary surrogation theory, Shevelev & Shevelev,
supra note 39.
69. Shevelev & Shevelev, supra note 39.
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that it is not conditional. It exists, producing a legal effect in full
measure even before the death of a person or separation of a part of
their body (can even have a market value.
Concretization,70 as applied to the human body, works in a way
that from the moment the body or its part ceases to be the receptacle
of the human person (what is excluded from circulation), abstract
ownership is seemingly attached to an object that has just arisen,
not excluded from the economic market. This is because previous
ownership had an abstract connection with that object, and as soon
as concrete ownership became possible on it, it automatically
belongs to the abstract owner. Concretization can manifest itself,
for example, at the moment of an individual’s death, when their
body ceases to be connected with their person.71 Therefore that
individual’s heirs, if any, would have inherited abstract ownership
(if it was not transferred to someone during the testator’s lifetime),
and receive the property which concretizes it ̶ a human body.
After a brief digression into the notion of abstract ownership,
this paper may describe how abstract ownership theory can be
applied to resolve the issue of when an implant, owned by one
person, is incorporated into the body of another. Before this implant
was attached to the human body of another person, the object in
question belonged to a third party and served as a concretization of
the object of abstract ownership of that third party. As soon as it
was incorporated into the human body of another person, this
implant ceased to be a concretization of the object of abstract
ownership, so that concrete ownership ceased to extend to it.
However, ownership itself has not ceased to exist, because with the
loss of concretization the abstract object and, with it, ownership, do
not cease to exist, as the abstract object does not need
concretization.72 Simultaneously, as soon as the artificial part of the
70. See id. (discussing the phenomenon of concretization).
71. Id.
72. Consequently, from the moment the artificial part is attached to the
body, any proprietary and similar effects aimed at the ownership will not
directly affect the object. In this context, the following example, previously
suggested in the literature, is interesting. A prosthesis placed instead of a hand
uses software installed on the prosthesis by the manufacturer. What happens if
the person wearing the prosthesis decides to hack the arm to install software
not covered by the license agreement (to do a so-called jailbreak)? Can the
company do for this violation of the agreement what it usually does for other
“devices” - to turn the device into a “brick”, to deprive it of its functionality by
making it a piece of useless material? See Ramachandran, supra note 23, at 256.
The author of the example concludes that such a thing would constitute a
battery with respect to the person using the prosthesis. Id. In our
understanding, if a prosthetic with software has been incorporated into the
body, then, if the relationship to the use of the software is governed by a license
agreement and that agreement is violated, the company has the right to impose
measures of any severity on the violator. However, they must refer to the
violator’s abstract ownership of the prosthesis, and so any penalties will only be
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person becomes property again, it again becomes a concretization of
the object of the abstract ownership that did not cease to exist. The
reason is that this ownership, having something akin to a “claim” to
this artificial body part as a future property, will be a stronger right
than any other right that seeks to engage the artificial part into its
orbit. This concept serves as the best explanation of how to protect
the rights of a person whose stolen body part has been attached to
another person without, at the same time, allowing ownership in
the recipient of the part in question.

B. The Natural-Artificial Dichotomy as an Engine of
Discrimination
This paper’s description of the legal status of artificial body
parts would be incomplete if it did not address the issue of
discrimination against people with artificial body parts. The
prohibition against unequal treatment of the rights falling into the
same category is of almost axiomatic character.73 If an artificial
able to physically affect the prosthesis from the moment it becomes the
concretization of an object of abstract ownership, that is, when it no longer is a
human body, but not earlier. It is noteworthy that the controversies between
body holders and the holders of rights in devices implemented into the human
body may soon reach an unbelievable number due to rapidly growing
technological progress. See Neuralink: Elon Musk Unveils Pig with Chip in its
Brain, BBC NEWS, www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53956683 [perma.cc/
CCU8-2KQ4] (Aug. 29, 2020) (reporting that Musk’s success as to the pig is a
first step to achieve the same success as to the human). This kind of device is
expected to be in considerable demand, as this technology promises to cure
many human diseases, see Lauren Golembiewski, Are You Ready for Tech That
Connects to Your Brain?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 28, 2020), www.hbr.org/2020/
09/are-you-ready-for-tech-that-connects-to-your-brain [perma.cc/2JBP-VHRU]
(reporting the treatment of spinal cord injuries by such brain chips); Helen
Mayberg, A Cloud Has Been Lifted: What Deep-Brain Stimulation Tells Us
About Depression and Depression Treatments, BRAIN AND BEHAV., (Sept. 17,
2018), www.bbrfoundation.org/content/cloud-has-been-lifted-what-deep-brainstimulation-tells-us-about-depression-and-depression
[perma.cc/9FF7-2V56]
(reporting the treatment of depression by such brain chips). Cf. Susan
Schneider, Should you add a microchip to your brain?, N.Y. TIMES, (June 10,
2019),
www.nytimes.com/2019/06/10/opinion/future-artificial-intelligencetranshumanism.html [perma.cc/UX2G-BLUA] (describing new useful functions
of brain chips, such as integrated calculation).
73. In the practice of the Council of Europe countries, this axiom was
reflected in equal treatment of persons in “an analogous or relevantly similar
situation,” see Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H. R., App. No. 29865/96, § 49
(Nov. 16, 2002); Nat’l & Provincial Bldg. Soc’y, Leeds Permanent Bldg. Soc’y
and Yorkshire Bldg. Soc’y v. U.K., Eur. Ct. H. R., App. Nos. 21319/93, 21449/93
and 21675/93, § 88 (Oct. 23, 1997). Inequality may only be excused, and not
amount to discrimination in the event there was “objective and reasonable
justification” for that. Konstantin Markin v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H. R., App. No.
30078/06, § 125 (March 22, 2012); Stec and Others v. U.K., Eur. Ct. H. R., App.
No. 65731/01, § 51 (Apr. 12, 2006); Raalte v. Neth., Eur. Ct. H. R., App. No.

634

UIC Law Review

[55:615

body part has been permanently attached to the body, it does not
differ essentially from the natural body itself.74 Both the natural
and artificial parts may be separated from the body with a higher
risk of harm to health (in comparison with easily detachable
dentures), but with a competent and appropriate medical procedure
can be organically reattached to the body.75 Otherwise, we would be
confronted with the resenting phenomenon of discrimination.
Discrimination against people with artificial body parts is often
caused by the denial or mere outward adherence to the principle of
full equality of artificial and natural body parts. 76 The most telling
example of logic tampered by the prejudice of inequality of body
parts is the perception of artificial body parts in sports.
The case of runner Oscar Pistorius, who was missing parts of
his legs, is quite famous, and illustrative of the perception of
artificial body parts in running.77 However, he did not want to be a
Paralympian,78 rather he wanted to participate on equal footing
with the “able-bodied” participants. Therefore, he decided to run in
special prosthetics to compensate for his disability. 79 The Court of
Arbitration for Sport heard Pistorius' case, 80 and found that it could
not be determined that the prosthesis created a clear advantage for
the athlete compared to other participants in the races.81 Although
20060/92, § 39 (Feb. 21, 1997). In the United States, the Equal Protection Clause
plays the same role. See infra Section IV.A.
74. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (discussing the similarity
between natural and artificial body parts from the sociological perspective).
75. Replantation, AM. ACADEMY OF ORTHOPEDIC SURGEONS,
www.orthoinfo.aaos.org/en/treatment/replantation/
[perma.cc/GV9Z-XSYF]
(last visited May 29, 2022, 12:15 PM) (defining replantation as “surgical
reattachment of a body part (such as a finger, hand, or toe) that has been
completely cut from the body”). See also Georg Mattiassich et al., Long-term
Outcome Following Upper Extremity Replantation After Major Traumatic
Amputation, 18 BMC MUSCULOSKELETAL DISORDERS 1, 1 (2017) (reporting that
successful replantation after major upper extremity amputation is possible in
77–93% of cases).
76. Cut and Loss: When Disability Strikes, DISABILITY CREDIT CANADA (Nov.
30, 2016), www.disabilitycreditcanada.com/amputation-cut-loss-disabilitystrikes/ [perma.cc/VP4J-DW5K] (defining amputation as “disabling and allencompassing, inflicting [...] social discrimination”). See also Kathleen Kraft
and Catherine E. Shoichet, Did Park Discriminate Against Girl With Prosthetic,
CNN (July 22, 2015),
www.edition.cnn.com/2015/07/21/us/oklahoma-girlprosthetic-leg-water-park/index.html [perma.cc/F777-DMXH] (reporting the
discrimination against young girl in water park based on her prosthesis),
77. Paralympics History, INT’L PARALYMPIC COMM., www.paralympic.org/
ipc/history [perma.cc/GZ9H-DM7Y] (last visited May 30, 2022, 12:13 AM).
78. See id. (defining a Paralympian as an athlete with an impairment and
providing a definition of Paralympic games).
79. See generally CAS 2008/A/1480 Pistorius v/ IAAF 1, 1-14 (2008)
(describing, among other things, the decision of Oscar Pistorius to participate
in the Olympiad with a prosthesis).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 53-54.
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in this case, the prosthesis was not implanted in Pistorius (the
prosthesis was removable, and not part of his body), the court's
analysis regarding prosthesis can be relevant to our examination of
the human body’s legal status.82
Interestingly, the court, in explaining which prosthetic devices
create a prohibited advantage, gave no attention to the fact that the
devices could be implanted into a person and become part of their
body. Instead, the court emphasized the improvement in the
athlete's physical performance resulting from the use of some device
of artificial nature.83 The latter point could be used against athletes
with artificial body parts.84 This paper argues that if a person
implants an artificial part into their body, it should be perceived
(unconditionally and without dispute) as if it had been with them
from birth. Consequently, whatever a person implants in their body,
their act of determination to change their body will be essential, and
they cannot be restricted, for example, from competing on an equal
footing with other athletes.85 Even if, objectively, a physical
82. Some authors have speculated about the implications of what would
have happened had the prosthesis been implanted in Pistorius, see Shawn M.
Crincoli, You Can Only Race if You Can't Win? The Curious Cases of Oscar
Pistorius & Caster Semenya, 12 TEX. REV. ENT. SPORTS L. 133, 182 (2011)
(writing that outside he would look like every other runner, but inside he would
possess some “less than” or “more than” human characteristics propelling his
locomotion).
83. A similar emphasis on the benefit arising from the use of technical aids
is common to other courts. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin 532 U.S. 661, 682-83
(2001) (siding with a disabled person who requested to be allowed to use a
technical device (special machine) to move around the golf course to compensate
for his mobility problems, saying that such measures should not result in an
advantage over other athletes). Other courts, following the rule in this decision,
have also considered whether the measure they have authorized would create
an “advantage” on the handicapped person's side, see Kuketz v. Petronelli, 821
N.E.2d 473 (Mass. 2005) (dismissing an appeal of a footless man seeking to get
permission to return the ball in a racquetball game after the second bounce, as
such permission would fundamentally alter the nature of this game). The
doctrine also supports the development of “clear rules” to calculate when an
advantage arises on the side of the person using prosthetic devices, see Alexis
Chappell, Running down a Dream: Oscar Pistorius, Prosthetic Devices, and the
Unknown Future of Athletes with Disabilities in the Olympic Games, 10 N.C.
J.L. & TECH. 16, 26-27 (2008).
84. The literature has previously explored the permissibility of limiting the
rights of athletes with prosthetic devices in the context of the rules governing
the advantage gained using prostheses. See Christopher Bidlack, The
Prohibition of Prosthetic Limbs in American Sports: The Issues and the Role of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 613, 633-66
(2009) (stating that analysis of a prosthetics ban in American sports has shown
that such a ban will likely be upheld by the courts).
85. A prohibition on competition addressed to athletes like Pistorius would
violate their right to dignity, see, e.g., Antonio Buti, Sport and the Law:
Pistorius: Reaching His Capabilities, 35 ALTERNATIVE L. J. 46, 47 (2010)
(highlighting the unlawfulness of such prohibition). Limiting the rights of
persons with artificial body parts is essentially the same as attempting to
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advantage were to arise over other athletes, the law should not
attach importance to this, just as it does not attach importance to
natural advantages. If a naturally gifted person (i.e. a one having
better physical conditions from birth) has the right to compete on
an equal footing with others who do not have the same physical
attributes,86 then no less can compete on equal terms with other
participants a person who chooses to correct nature's deficiencies
and to give a bodily advantage to themselves.87

C. Separated Body Parts: Where the Body Ends
To properly determine the legal status of natural body parts as
well as artificial body parts, which, from the moment of accession,
are satisfied with the identical status as the former, it is necessary
to implement a meaningful dichotomous division of parts based on
their separateness. According to this dichotomy, all parts of the
human body are either separated or not separated. Only the
separated parts received a special meaning and status from these
parts, for which there is a rational explanation. Until the moment
of separation, all parts of the human body are not something
independent, separate, and share a single status with the entire
human body as a whole. Accordingly, the undetached body parts are
not considered to be things or property.88

control their bodies, see Jonathan Liljeblad, Foucault, Justice, and Athletes with
Prosthetics: The 2008 CAS Arbitration Report on Oscar Pistorius, 15 INT'L
SPORTS L. J. 101, 110 (2015) (noting this restriction of disabled persons’ rights).
See also Isabel Karpin & Roxanne Mykitiuk, Going Out On A Limb: Prosthetics,
Normalcy and Disputing The Therapy/Enhancement Distinction, 16 MED. L.
REV. 413, 427 (2008) (stating that criticism of Pistorius’ use of prosthetics
represents an inadequate view of the technologically-modified human body);
Contra Particia J. Zettler, Is it Cheating to Use Cheetahs?: The Implications of
Technologically Innovative Prostheses for Sports Values and Rules, 27 BU INT'L
L. J. 367, 391 (2009) (justifying the validity of banning prostheses if they create
an advantage for their user).
86. See Erin Buzuvis, Hormone Check: Critique of Olympic Rules on Sex and
Gender, 31 WIS. J. L. GENDER & SOC'Y 29, 43 (2016) (providing a long list of
abnormal physical attributes that arise naturally and confer a physical
advantage that still does not preclude an athlete from competing).
87. The purpose of sport is self-improvement (in the context of Pistorius), see
Peter Charlish & Stephen Riley, Should Oscar Run?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 929, 954-55 (2008) (emphasizing the importance of
this aim). Assuming this, changing one’s own body through prosthetics is not
condemnable, as the path to earning one's own advantage and perfection and
improving one's body is different for each individual.
88. See Carl Gareis, Allgemeines Staatsrecht, in 1 Marquardsen’s Handbuch
des Öffentlichen Rechts, at 33 (1884) (Ger.) (reporting this approach in old
German law); 1 Konrad Cosack, Lehrbuch des Deutschen bürgerlichen Rechts
139 (1898) (Ger.); Erwin Deutsch & Andreas Spickhoff, Medizinrecht, at recitals
609, 611-2 (5th ed. 2003) (Ger.) (following this view from the current German
law standpoint); Otto Depenheuer in: v. Mangoldt/Klein/Starck GG, 5th ed.
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The most striking case regarding the legal status of undivided
body parts is Regina v. Bentham.89 This case considered whether a
person could be found to have committed an offense by imitation of
a weapon when the main element of the imitation was an arm. 90
The lower courts answered in the affirmative, while the House of
Lords rejected such and pointed out that no one can possess what is
not separated from him.91 Lord Bingham pointed out that a human’s
hand and fingers are not separated from a human, therefore, they
cannot be possessed.92 Such a cogent and comprehensible forming
rationale for why one cannot consider one’s own body as a weapon
was followed by another argument showing the absurdity of such a
qualification. Lord Bingham pointed out that if it were possible for
the purposes of the law governing the commission of a crime with a
weapon to recognize fingers or hands as weapons, then the court
could decide to take possession of the weapon from the offender to
the police.93 However, the latter argument, while certainly
persuasive and strong, is rather misguided and constitutes the wellknown logical trick of fake limiting the possible choices: “Either we
do not recognize the finger as a weapon, or we have to confiscate it.”
In fact, there are more options and it is likely that in such a case
the Lord’s opponents would have applied a teleological reduction of
the law.
The fact that many people did not fall for this trick (or, more
likely, were simply not familiar with it) has led to an abundance of
practice recognizing body parts as “weapons.” For example, in In re
D.T, the court, in proving that a person committed a crime while
being in possession of a dangerous weapon, pointed out that it saw

2005, Art. 14 recital 144 (Ger.). Accordingly, until a part of the body has been
separated, classical theory does not permit a transfer of rights to it, see Erwin
Riezler, Arbeitskraft und Arbeitsfreiheit in Ihrer Privatrechtlichen Bedeutung,
27 Archiv für bürgerliches Recht [ArchBürgR] 219, 240 (1906) (Ger.) (providing
justification for the classical theory approach regarding separated body parts).
Even at the obligation level, it is considered that a contract is not made in
relation to such a part of the body, but in relation to a future property that will
arise after separation from the body of the person, see Francesco Carnelutti,
Problema Giuridico della Trasfusione di Sangue, 4 Il Foro Italiano 103, 103
(1938) (It.) (exemplifying with blood flowing from the body). However, if we
accept our theory of abstract ownership in the body, it would be permissible to
transfer rights to the undivided parts even before separation. The reason is that
abstract ownership is only concretized at the moment of separation, but exists
even before that moment.
89. Regina v. Bentham [2005] UKHL 18; [2005] 1 WLR 1057 (Eng.)
90. Id. at 1.
91. Id. at 8.
92. See id. (Lord Bingham of Cornhill, majority) (“[a]n unsevered hand or
finger is part of oneself. [t]therefore one cannot possess it). See also id. at 14
(Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, majority) (quoting Ulpian’s famous statement in
support of this thesis that no one can have a right of ownership in themselves).
93. Id.
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nothing strange in allowing “possession of teeth”. 94 To avoid being
attacked by opponents, the court stated that it did not follow its
prior decision that any person that broke into someone else's home
would be considered to have committed the intrusion with a
dangerous weapon (teeth, which are always with the person). 95 The
court noted this was because teeth are only weapons when they are
“intended to be used” respectively.96 The court in Shaw v. State ̶
whose logic might be an interesting objection to the main thesis of
Regina v. Bentham ̶ noted that it did not need to establish the
presence of a separate weapon, but only needed to establish the
presence of a “means likely to produce death or serious bodily
harm”.97 This practice, contrary to its prevalence,98 does not inspire
confidence. Further, it does not hold water not only for reasons of
intuitive rejection of the unnatural qualification of teeth, fists, and
the like as weapons, but also because of a failure to explain how a
person can be a “means” used by themselves. Therefore, it is more
convincing the case law which does not allow to see in undivided
parts of the human body an object of possession, inter alia,
weapons.99

94. In re D.T., 977 A.2d 346, 352 (D.C. 2009).
95. Id. at 354.
96. Id.
97. Shaw v. State, 139 So. 3d 79, 90 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Jackson v.
State, 594 So. 2d 20, 24 (Miss. 1992)) (recognizing teeth as a weapon and
addressing the issue of recognizing a person’s fists as weapons).
98. See State v. Neatherlin, 141 N.M. 328, 334-35 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007)
(concluding that a jury could reasonably determine that the human mouth is a
deadly weapon if the mouth is used in a manner that could cause death or great
bodily harm); see United States v. Sturgis, 48 F.3d 784, 788 (4th Cir.1995)
(finding that the teeth of an HIV-positive person may be considered a weapon);
see also United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163, 1168 (8th Cir.1988) (holding
possibility of AIDS transmission by means of a human bite "too remote" in a
legal context “to support a finding that the mouth and teeth may be considered
a deadly and dangerous weapon in this respect”); e.g., Brock v. State, 555 So.2d
285, 287-88 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (stating that teeth can be a deadly weapon
but ruling that no evidence was presented that the biting in this case had the
capacity to result in serious physical injury).
99. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 190, 192-8 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1980) (refuting the admissibility of qualifying a human body part as a
weapon); See also People v. Owusu, 93 N.Y.2d 398, 405 (N.Y. 1999) (holding that
teeth, a body part, do not constitute an “instrument” under the statute); see
Ransom v. State, 460 P.2d 170 at 172 (stating that bare hands and feet cannot
be qualified as weapons); see also Dickson v. State, 230 Ark. 491, 492 (1959)
(finding that feet with shoes as an ordinary apparel is not a weapon); see Reed
v. Commonwealth, 248 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Ky. 1952) (concluding that hands and
feet are not deadly weapons); see State v. Calvin, 209 La. 257, 265-6 (1945)
(stating that “no authority of law [...] which classifies one's bare hands or teeth
as a dangerous weapon”); e.g., People v. VanDiver, 80 Mich. App. 352, 356-57
(1977) (reaching the same conclusion on bare hands); see also People v. Vollmer,
299 N.Y. 347, 350 (1949) (saying that a dangerous weapon is “something quite
different from the bare fist of an ordinary man); see State v. Wier, 22 Or. App.
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III. EVOLUTION OF THE BODY CONCEPT: REVIEWING THE
THEORY OF FUNCTIONAL BODY
As mentioned previously, separated parts of the human body
have a special status. However, that analysis exclusively focused on
the state of separateness. 100 This approach may have been correct
in the past,101 but it should be reconsidered. In the phrase
“separated body parts,” the concept of the body is as important as
the criterion of separateness. Without a definition of what the body
is, it is impossible to say what the separated parts from the body
are. Defining the concept of the body may seem, at first glance,
uncomplicated.102 But, such an impression is deceptive and
conditioned by the everyday view of legal concepts, which identifies
the biological body with the legal body of a person. For the sake of
fairness, it should be noted that the separation of the legal concept
of the body from the biological one is a product of recent times. The
separation of the legal concept of the human body is explained by
revolutionary social103 and technological104 changes in society.
These changes provided practical prerequisites for the human
being: (1) going beyond an individual’s natural body, and (2)
updating the old, narrow concept of the human body. Although
there has not been a revolution in the understanding of the body in
549 (1975) (saying that a dangerous weapon is different from the bare hand of
an ordinary man).
100. See supra II.C (discussing the separateness as a criterion of body parts).
101. See, e.g., ROHAN HARDCASTLE, LAW AND THE HUMAN BODY 145-172
(2007) (discussing the notion of detached body parts and its significance).
102.
See,
e.g.,
Human
Body,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
www.britannica.com/science/human-body [perma.cc/WL97-MSY3] (last visited
May 30, 2022, 9:48 AM) (defining the human body as “the physical substance of
the human organism, composed of living cells and extracellular materials and
organized into tissues, organs, and systems”). The law, however, cannot boast
of the same progress in defining the concept of the human body. See Paolo Zatti,
Verso un Diritto per la Bioetica: Risorse e Limiti del Discorso Giuridico, 1 RIV.
DIR. CIV. 43, 43-4 (It.) (emphasizing the inability of the law to define the concept
of the human body).
103. The end of racial segregation in the USA was indeed a great progress
in championing truly democratic values of omni-equality, see, e.g., Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding educational
segregation unconstitutional, bringing the “separate-but-equal” education era
to an end); Civil Rights Act (L. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241, enacted July 2, 1964)
(legally ending the segregation institutionalized by Jim Crow laws); Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (overcoming legal barriers at
the state and local levels that prevented African Americans from exercising
their right to vote).
104. See, e.g., Clyde Barker & James Markmann, Historical Overview of
Transplantation, 3 Cold Spring Harbor Perspectives in Medicine 1, 1-15 (2017)
www.doi.org/10.1101/cshperspect.a014977 (highlighting the development of
transplantation science in the 20th century).
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jurisprudence to this date, some bold (though unintentional)
advances in the understanding of the body have taken place, most
notably in the concept of the functional human body.

A. Developed Phase: German105 Approach
The theory of the functional body was first developed by the
German Supreme Court in the famous case of reproductive male
cells.106 In this case, the male plaintiff was undergoing treatment
for cancer.107 He knew that continued treatment would cause him
to lose his reproductive capacity, so he decided to provide his sperm
for cryopreservation108 before treatment began.109 Subsequently,
because of the clinic’s negligence, the sperm was destroyed. 110 The
clinic acknowledged the negligence of its actions, and was prepared
to compensate for the breach of duty of care.111 However, the clinic
did not fail to take advantage of the weaknesses of German tort
law.112 It indicated that it would not pay moral damages for the
plaintiff’s suffering from the loss of his procreative capacity, as
there was no statutory basis for claiming this harm. 113 The German
Supreme Court had to find a basis for damages to a person who
surrendered his sperm for procreative purposes under a storage
contract, in accordance with the rules of § 847 BGB, 114 which only
provided for moral damages in cases of damage to the human body
and human health.115 The Court, in awarding moral damages for
105. For a helpful guide explaining the meaning of all German legal
abbreviation to be used in this paper see GERMAN LAW RESEARCH, HARVARD
LAW
SCHOOL
LIBRARY
(last
updated
Mar.
30,
2022)
guides.library.harvard.edu/GermanLaw
[https://perma.cc/S3MD-W5J6]
(providing for an English-written guide on German legal abbreviations).
106. See BGH, 9 Nov. 1993, VI ZR 62/93 (describing for the first time the
concept of the functional body).
107. Id. at 2.
108. Sperm cryopreservation (“sperm freezing”) is a technique principally
used to store sperm in safe conditions for patients undergoing cancer therapy
and play a vital role in treating couples with infertility, see generally Hamoun
Rozati et al., Process and Pitfalls of Sperm Cryopreservation, 6 J CLINICAL MED.
1, 2 (2017) (reporting the high viability of sperm stored by this technique).
109. BGH, 9 Nov. 1993, VI ZR 62/93 at 4.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] (German Civil Code) § 253
(establishing the basis for damages claim).
113. BGH, 9 Nov. 1993, VI ZR 62/93 at 4.
114. BGB § 847 (repealed as of 1 August 2022) (setting out the grounds for
moral damages claim).
115. Such an action is explained by the fact that moral damages cannot be
compensated without an express statutory provision. In contractual claims
(including those relating to semen storage), no compensation for moral damages
is possible. See Gottfried Schiemann, Schmerzensgeld bei Fehlgeschlagener
Sterilisation, 1980 JuS 709, 713 (Ger.) (explaining the rationale of this rule);
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injury to the body, deduced that spermatozoa taken to restore
eventual reproductive capacity loss were “no less important to the
bodily integrity of a person and their right to self-determination and
self-realization, than the bodily parts directly attached to them.” 116
The Court went beyond determining the legal status of the
plaintiff’s sperm and established the famous rule on functional
body.117 According to this rule, any body part taken from a person
at their will in order to be later reunited with them is considered a
functional body until it is reunited, since that body part is intended
to preserve or realize the functions of the body as a whole.118
The theory of the functional body has been widely discussed
and widely endorsed in literature and case law. Many, in
determining the legal status of separated body parts in property
law, point out that they become things and property only when they
are finally separated (e.g., hair, teeth, and donor organs). 119 But if
they are intended to be returned back to the body (e.g., autologous
blood), the legal regime of the human body continues to apply to
separated parts, contrary to the physical separation from the
Karl Larenz & Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts II/2, at 590
(13th ed. 1994) (Ger.). Such a strange restriction of contractual liability as
compared to tort liability has been criticized as “factually unreasonable”. Hans
Stoll, Haftungsfolgen im Bürgerlichen Recht 16 (1993). Some authors have
called for a revision of such a rule, see Peter Schlechtriem in: 2 Gutachten und
Vorschläge zur Überarbeitung des Schuldrechts 1654-6 (1981) (Ger.) (arguing
in favor of compensation of moral damages caused in contractual relations).
However, given that the norm of § 253 BGB is not considered imperative by
some court and scholars, (BGH, 1955 JZ 581; Heinrich Honsell, Die Misslungene
Urlaubsreise - BGHZ 63, 98, 1976 JuS 222, 225 n.27), there have been some
attempts to subsume non-pecuniary damage under compensation in the
contractual relationship if the contractual relationship was directly aimed at
satisfying the personal, intangible interests of the creditor, see Hans Stoll,
Kommentar, BGH Jan. 8, 1975, VIII ZR 126/73, 1975 JZ 252, 255; Karsten
Küppers, Verdorbene Genüsse und vereitelte Aufwendungen im
Schadensersatzrecht 152-4 (1976) (Ger.); Franz Braschos, Der Ersatz
Immaterieller Schäden im Vertragsrecht 69-71, 230-2 (1979) (Ger.).
116. BGH, 9 Nov. 1993, VI ZR 62/93 at p. 9.
117. Id. at 7-8.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., FG Niedersachsen, BeckRS 2009, 26028117 (Ger.) (concerning
blood serum). See also Erwin Deutsch & Andreas Spickhoff, Medizinrecht, at
recital 613 (5th ed. 2003) (Ger.) (describing the separation as the fact making
body part property); Jessica Schmidt in: Erman BGB, 16th ed. 2020, § 90 recital
5 (Ger.). See also Markus Parzeller & Hansjürgen Bratzke, Rechtsverhältnisse
am Menschlichen Körper unter Besonderer Berücksichtigung einer
Kommerzialisierung der Organ- und Gewebetransplantation, 2003
Rechtsmedizin 357, 358 (Ger.) (arguing that once separated the body part
becomes property unless aimed at the later reuniting with the whole body);
WOLFGANG BREHM & CHRISTIAN BERGER, SACHENRECHT 26-27 (3rd ed. 2014)
(Ger.) (writing that a body part, not intended by its source to be reunited, or
that is not capable of later reuniting, is to be considered property); CHRISTIANE
WENDEHORST IN: MÜKOBGB, 8th ed. 2021, EGBGB Art. 43 recital 19 (Ger.)
(same as finding in Brehm & Berger).
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body.120 This paper agrees that the harm caused to the separated
parts must qualify as harm to the human body, considering that
these separated parts, on the basis of their purpose,121 continue to
be part of the body.122
However, this innovative approach became the object of harsh
criticism and disapproval from a wide range of theorists who hold
outdated views.123 Proponents of this concept are convinced that the
human body can be considered only that which is not physically
separated from the body. 124 If the parts of the body are separated
from the body, then they must be treated as things. 125 This decision
has even become the subject of jokes. For example, Taupitz writes
that the German Supreme Court has done with the law what was
previously available only in the tales of the saints – the
simultaneous presence of the body in different places

120. DEUTSCH & SPICKHOFF, supra note 27, at recital 613.
121. See LUTZ MICHALSKI IN: ERMAN BGB, 12th ed. 2008, § 90 recital 5 (Ger.)
(highlighting the decisiveness of the purpose of separation in the legal
qualification of both the status of separated bodily parts and the acts committed
in relation to them); RENATE SCHAUB IN: PWW BGB, 3rd ed. 2008, § 823 recital
24 (Ger.).
122. See, e.g., York Schnorbus, Schmerzensgeld wegen Schuldhafter
Vernichtung von Sperma, 1994 JUS 830 (arguing harm to sperm falls into the
category of bodily harm); ANSGAR STAUDINGER IN: HK-BGB, 10th ed. 2019, §
823 recital 7 (Ger.). Cf., e.g., WERNER LÜCKE IN: PRÖLSS/MARTIN VVG, 31st ed.
2021, at AHB Abs. 1, Ziff. 1, recital 35 (Ger.) (arguing that this conclusion also
applies in insurance cases); CLAUS VON RINTELEN IN: SPÄTE/SCHIMIKOWSKI
HAFTPFLICHTVERSICHERUNG, 2nd ed. 2015, at AHB Abs. 1, Ziff. 1. recital 136
(Ger.).
123.
See
THOMAS
PFEIFFER
IN:
LINDENMAIER/MÖHRING,
NACHSCHLAGEWERK DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS. BGH, URTEIL VOM 09-111993 - VI ZR 62/93, at § 823 (Aa) Nr. 151 Bl. 3 (Ger.) (arguing that this solution
dilutes the concept of the human body); Wolfgang Nixdorf, Zur Ärztlichen
Haftung Hinsichtlich Entnommener Körpersubstanzen: Körper, Persönlichkeit,
Totenfürsorge, 1995 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERSICHERUNGSRECHT, HAFTUNGS- UND
SCHADENSRECHT [VERSR] 740, 743-74 (Ger.) (averring that if the initial purpose
of reuniting has changed, the legal status of such separated body part becomes
uncertain); Andreas Voß, Die Durchkreuzung des Manifestierten
Familienplanes als Deliktische Integritätsverletzung, 1999 VERSR 545, 549-51
(Ger.) (stating that the German Supreme Court should focus on the right of
family planning rather than on a functional body when deciding the case of
destroyed sperm)..
124. See, e.g., Laufs & Reiling, supra note 27, at 775 (proving commentary
on the famous BGH’s decision on the functional body); Dominik Peris,
Anmerkung zum BGH Urteil vom 9.11.1993 - VI ZR 62/92, 1994 MEDR 113
(Ger.).
125. It has been suggested that detached bodily parts that are intended to
be reunited with the body are still things, see HANNS PRÜTTING, SACHENRECHT,
at recital 5 (37th ed. 2020) (providing justification for this approach) Cf. MARINA
WELLENHOFER, SACHENRECHT, at § 1 recital 20 (35th ed. 2020) (Ger.) (arguing,
however, that these things are subject not only to the right of ownership but
also to the personality rights, which prevail over the former).
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(Multilokation).126 Such a joke, however, conceals a fundamental
objection to the theory of the functional body, which is that the
human body, according to law, can now find itself in places and
situations in which it is not universally expected to be. 127 Taupitz
argues, not unreasonably, that recognition of the concept of the
functional body entails a “delocalization of the body” for purposes of
establishing bodily violation.128 The logical consequence is that of
such characterization, in the case of strict liability, offenders would
be liable for harm to the body even when they could not have known
that the object being harmed was the body. 129 As the saying goes,
‘they who prove too much, prove nothing’ (qui nimium probat, nihil
probat). Such an objection should not be addressed to those who
recognize the existence of a functional body. Rather, it is for those
who unjustifiably expand the limits of strict liability by allowing a
person to be required to pay damages when they objectively lacked
a reasonable opportunity to be aware of the importance of the object
to which the harm is inflicted.
The concept of the functional body has also been the subject of
extensive discussion in criminal law. There is a debate in criminal
law as to whether a functional body should be recognized as a body
for the purpose of classifying acts against such a “body” as bodily
injury (Körperverletzung).130 While it was generally thought that
the paragraph providing for this crime was intended to protect
health and physical integrity,131 the later interpretation of the
object of the crime became such that it was seen as the core of the
potential to “develop personal freedom.”132 This interpretation
126. See Jochen Taupitz, Der Deliktsrechtliche Schutz des Menschlichen
Körpers und Seiner Teile, 1995 NJW 745, 746 (Ger.) (explaining the
phenomenon of Multilokation).
127. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (pointing out that the
objects, physically located outside the human body, shall not be considered a
person’s body).
128. Taupitz, supra note 126, at 750.
129. See Id. (describing the basis for such liability).
130. Strafgesetzbuch (Penal Code) [StGB] § 223 (Ger.) (establishing that
under the crime of Körperverletzung, any person who physically assaults or
injures the health of another person shall be held criminally liable).
131. See Albin Eser, Medizin und Strafrecht: Eine Schutzgutorientierte
Problemübersicht,
97
ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR
DIE
GESAMTE
STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [ZSTW] 1, 3-5 (1985) (favoring the protection of
physical integrity of a person); MARTIN HEGER IN: LACKNER/KÜHL
STRAFGESETZBUCH, 28th ed. 2014, § 223 recital 1; HANS LILIE IN: LEIPZIGER
KOMMENTAR STRAFGESETZBUCH, 12th ed. ab. 2006, Vor § 223 recital 1. Cf.
MANFRED MAIWALD IN: 1 MAURACH/SCHROEDER STRAFRECHT BESONDERER
TEIL, at § 8 recitals 3, 5 (10th ed. 2009) (reporting the debates on the aim
pursued by these criminal law provisions).
132. GUNTHER ARZT ET AL., STRAFRECHT BESONDERER TEIL, LEHRBUCH,
2nd ed., § 6 recitals 1, 26; UWE HELLMANN IN: 1 KREY/HELLMANN/HEINRICH
STRAFRECHT BESONDERER TEIL, 16th ed. 2015, recital 217. But see 2 HARRO
OTTO, GRUNDKURS STRAFRECHT, at § 15 recital 2 (7th ed. 2005) (mentioning not
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opened the way for some scholars to recognize that sperm and eggs
(as well as other separated body parts) that are intended to be
returned to the body are considered to be the object of bodily
injury.133
The dominant view in criminal law, represented by leading
experts, nevertheless, criticizes the concept of the functional
body.134 For instance, the majority view is that the “civilistic
interpretation” of the body is overly broad and diverges from the
general criminal law understanding of the body. 135 From such
beliefs, it is deduced that criminal law has its own, isolated concept
of the body.136 This concept has no place for an unreasonable
division into property and the body, depending on the will of the
individual to reunite the separated part with the whole body. 137
Under this criminal law approach, in contrast to the civil law
viewpoint, any separated parts of the body are property.138 Such a
following the liberal approach as to the object of a crime of bodily injury).
133. See Georg Freund & Friedrich Heubel, Der Menschliche Körper als
Rechtsbegriff, 1995 MEDR 194, 197-98 (claiming that in such case the damage
to the separated body part would not constitute a crime against property); RALF
ESCHELBACH IN: BECKOK STGB, 49th ed. 2021, § 223 recital 14 (calling the
punishment of crimes against temporarily removed body parts under the rules
of bodily injury as an exception from the general rule that harm to these parts
be deemed proprietary).
134. See, e.g., Friedrich-Christian Schroeder, Begriff und Rechtsgut der
“Körperverletzung”, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS JOACHIM HIRSCH ZUM 70 725, at
737 (Thomas Weigend & Georg Kupper eds., 1999) (comparing the civil and
criminal law concepts of human body). See also THOMAS FISCHER IN: FISCHER
KOMMENTAR ZUM STGB, 64th ed. 2017, § 223 recital 2 (emphasizing the nonexistence of a wide functional body concept in the German criminal law); Harro
Otto, Der Strafrechtliche Schutz des Menschlichen Körpers und Seiner Teile,
1996 JURA 219 (alleging that the German Supreme Court’s decision of
functional body may distance civil and criminal law from each other).
135. See KRISTIAN KÜHL IN: LACKNER/KÜHL STGB, 29th ed. 2018, § 223
recital 1 (Ger.) (calling the civilistic interpretation of the body broad, and
leading to the separation of criminal and civil body concepts).
136. See Kretschmer, supra note 64, at 107 (demonstrating the difference
between civil and criminal law concepts of the human body).
137. See id. (arguing that the individual’s will does not matter). If one is
guided solely by the approach of the German Supreme Court, then, from the
standpoint of protecting the interests of an individual in organs and tissues,
there is indeed an unwarranted division. This is because the blood taken from
a person to give it back to them would be their body part, while the donor kidney
required for transplantation to a person would not be recognized as part of the
body of the future recipient, see Hardtung, supra note 49, at 865 (noting the
illogicality of such decision).
138. See Kretschmer, supra note 64, at 107 (arguing that criminal law deems
separated body parts as property). See also BGH, 6 BGHSt 377, 378 (Ger.)
(stating that here is a long tradition that criminal law “must follow what civil
law recognizes as things and property” (and, accordingly, what it does not
regard as things or property)); REINHART MAURACH IN: 2 MAURACH/SCHROEDER
STRAFRECHT BESONDERER TEIL, AT § 26 II A 2A (2ND ED.) (citing 6 BGHST 377);
HANS-JÜRGEN BRUNS, DIE BEFREIUNG DES STRAFRECHTS VOM ZIVILISTISCHEN
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position is fundamentally flawed; its apologists fail to properly
appreciate the existential importance of the goal for which the
organs are separated from the person – the preservation of body
functions essential to both biological139 and social140 life. Likely,
critics of the functional body in criminal law implicitly hold that it
is impossible to consider something that does not entail harm to the
health of the human body as a bodily injury. This paper finds the
following rhetorical question to be appropriate: If criminal law
considers such “harmless” acts as cutting off beards or some hairs
as a crime against bodily inviolability, 141 then how can it not, a
fortiori, protect the more important reproductive function of the
human body? To protect human rights, criminal and civil law must
be united in applying the concept of the functional body as broadly
as possible.
In practice, unfortunately, courts invent many ways to get
around the concept of the functional body. For instance, one court
asserted that the German Supreme Court in its decision used the
functional body theory exclusively for the purpose of compensating
the injury to the body, and in other cases it is inadmissible to
proceed from the existence of a functional body.142 Another court,
proving the correctness of its restrictive interpretation, focused on
the way in which separated body parts are used in relation to the
whole body.143 This court pointed out that for the separated body
parts to be recognized property they shall be returned to the body
in a manner comparable to surgery (for example, transfusion of
autologous blood during surgery).144 Therefore, in cases where
DENKEN 291-92 (1938).
139. Some authors contend that the removal of organs and other
biomaterials for subsequent use is often a medical necessity rather than a
spontaneous human whim, see, e.g., Ajit Walunj et al., Autologous Blood
Transfusion, 6 CONTINUING EDU. IN ANESTHESIA CRITICAL CARE & PAIN, 192,
192 (2006) (asserting that the driving force for the use of autologous blood
transfusion is “to reduce the risk of transmission of infection” which may be
received with the donor’s blood).
140. See, e.g., Freezing Sperm, WOMEN & INFANTS: FERTILITY CENTER,
www.fertility.womenandinfants.org/treatment/fertility-preservation/freezingsperm [perma.cc/A2DN-X8PG] (last visited June 1, 2022, 6:04 PM) (explaining
how sperm preservation can save men’s fertility and, thus, such a social function
as the ability to continue one’s lineage).
141. BGH, Sept. 25, 1952, 3 StR 742/51 (concerning cutting off a hair against
another’s will); BGH, July 5, 1966, 5 StR 280/66 (Ger.) (considering cutting off
a hair against another’s will); BERNHARD HARDTUNG IN: MÜKOSTGB, 3rd ed.
2017, § 223 recital 9 (Ger.) (regarding toenails and fingernails). See also Director
of Public Prosecutions v. Smith [2006] EWHC 94 (Admin) (Eng.) (cutting off a
bundle of hair was qualified as an injury to the human body).
142. See BVerwG, June 11, 1997, 3 B 130.96 (arguing that for the purpose
of the German Medical Products Act, the blood aimed at autologous use shall be
deemed property).
143. BayObLG, Apr. 29, 1998, 4 St. RR 12/98 (Ger.).
144. Id. at 72-73.
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autologous biomaterials are used for therapeutic effects on the body,
such as treatment of neurodermatitis by means of preparations of a
person's own blood, these biomaterials lack the status of functional
body and the regulations on drugs shall be applicable to them. 145
The concept of the functional body is particularly neglected in
tax law. In a case before the Cologne Court,146 a plaintiff engaged in
the medical activity of taking cartilage material from his body from
which were isolated and multiplied cartilage cells (chondrocytes),
then to be used for reimplantation into his body. 147 To protect
himself from the tax authorities’ claim that transactions with this
“property” were taxable, the plaintiff argued that the cells, as
separated body parts to be reimplanted into the body, could not be
considered as property, and were therefore not taxable.148 The court
acted in a rather interesting way. It pointed out that the functional
body decision could be limited only to the purpose of damages. 149
Although a little further down the line it did not choose to take that
as the basis for resolving the situation.150 Instead, the court
indicated that tax law must abstract from civil law and may treat
as property even that which is recognized as a body in civil law,
since the economic function of the disputed object testifies in favor
of its property character.151 We note that such logic is extremely
doubtful, as it is unreasonable to justify through the economic
function the fundamental change in the status of an object. To
accept this reasoning is just as well to justify slavery, since it will
be accepted by the established economic function of the body of a
certain person, and the fact that this is considered as “body under
civil law” will not prevent taxation in the tax law. Such decisions,
together with the studied doctrine, allows this paper to conclude
that the revolutionary idea, openly declared by the German
Supreme Court, has received neither proper recognition, nor
development.

145. Id.
146. FG Köln, Dec. 19, 2006, 6 K 912/04, DStRE 2007, 965 (Ger.).
147. Id. at 966.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 967.
150. Id.
151. Id. A similar conclusion on the functional body can be found in
Bundesfinanzhof [BFH] Apr. 1, 2009, XI R 52/07 (Ger.) (holding that the
revenue from the removal of joint cartilage cells to be reimplanted into their
source is tax-exempted); see also Case C 156/09, Finanzamt Leverkusen v.
Verigen Transplantation Service International AG, ECLI:EU:C:2010:695, § 29
(Nov, 18, 2010) (reaching the same conclusion on the basis of a rather poor
reasoning in comparison to the Cologne court).
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B. Betwixt and Between: Halfway Approach of Other
Continental Law Countries
Concepts like the functional body have emerged outside of
Germany, which, although not seriously substantiated or debated,
are also worthy of discussion. For instance, in France, it is
commonly viewed that human organs (upon separation) continue to
be in the orbit of the persona (graviter dans son orbite), and
therefore have the status of the persona themselves.152 The French
courts, probably unfamiliar with the German concept of the
functional body, invented something similar, and went much
further. They went so far as to claim that a guide dog 153 can be, for
a blind person, a part of the body which is a visual prosthesis. 154
Such a dog is recognized in the French doctrine as “personne par
destination” (part of a person by virtue of destination).155 As this
paper argues for the new theory of bodiliness, the French approach
is unfavorable, as it denies the independent legal status of the dog.
Implementation of this approach would exclude the freedom to
dispose of the dog to the same extent that a person can freely,
without being subject to criminal and civil liability, dispose of their
own body. The value of something to a person, including a dog, does

152. Édith Deleury, La Personne en son Corps: l'Éclatement du Sujet, 70
CAN. B. REV. 448, 471 (1991) (Can.); Pascal Labbée, L'Articulation du Droit des
Personnes et des Choses, 243 LES PETITES AFFICHES 30, 32 (2002); JeanChristophe Galloux, Essai de Définition d'un Statut Juridique 81 (1988) (PhD
dissertation) (on file with the Université de Bordeaux); GLENN RIVARD & JUDY
HUNTER, THE LAW OF ASSISTED HUMAN REPRODUCTION 81, 84 (2005); Lise
Giard, Les Parties Détachées du Corps Humain, des “Choses” et des “Biens” dans
la Conception Contemporaine du Droit, 11 JURISDOCTORIA 43, 52 (2014). Accord
Paolo Zatti, Il Corpo e la Nebulosa dell'Appartenenza. Dalla Sovranità alla
Proprietà, in PER UNO STATUTO DEL CORPO 71 (Cosimo Mazzoni ed., 2008) (It.);
Paolo Zatti, Principi e Forme di Governo del Corpo, in TRATTATO DI BIODIRITTO
99 (Stefano Rodotà & Paolo Zatti eds., 2011) (It.).
It is similar to the statement found in the Dutch doctrine that a severed
bodily part, in order to become property, must cease to be within the sphere of
the personality rights of the person from whom it was severed, see 1 ASSER ET
AL., MR. C. ASSER'S HANDLEIDING TOT DE BEOEFENING VAN HET NEDERLANDS
BURGERLIJK RECHT § 58 (2006).
153. Guide, or service dogs are defined as “dogs that are individually trained
to do work or perform tasks for people with disabilities.” ADA 2010 Revised
Requirements: Service Animals, US DEP’T. OF JUST. (June 12, 2011),
www.ada.gov/service_animals_2010.htm [https://perma.cc/ZX95-JLZB].
154. TGI Lille, Mar. 23, 1999, D. 1999, 350; TGI Lille, June 7, 2000; Xavier
Labbée, Le Chien Prothèse, 36 D. 750, 750 (2000). But see CA Paris, June 19,
2020, No. 18/03104 (denying plaintiff recognition of the glasses breakage as an
accident at work, since “harm to glasses or [other external] prostheses cannot
be considered as harm to the body (dommage corporel)”).
155. Blandine Mallet-Bricout & Nadège Reboul-Maupin, Droit des Biens:
Panorama 2005, D. 2352, 2355 (2005); CYRIL BLOCH & PHILIPPE LE TOURNEAU,
PRÉJUDICE EXTRAPATRIMONIAL ch. 2125, § 2125.72 (2021-2022).
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not automatically turn that something into a part of the person
themselves.156
In some countries it is possible to find the concept of the
functional body quite identical to the German one. For example, the
Swiss doctrine recognizes that if an organ has been separated from
the human body, but has retained functional unity with it through
the purpose of autologous use, it does not lose its connection with
the person and remains an organ.157 The implementation of the
functional body theory will not cause rejection from the part of the
civil law corpus. This is evidenced by the prevalence in Switzerland
of the concept holding that when different physical objects have a
single functional purpose and have a functional connection, it is
permissible to recognize them as a single object. 158 However, such
an identity of concepts is exceptionally rare.

C. Germinal Stage: Common Law Approach
It is difficult to find the concept of the functional body in
common law countries, but it is reasonable to say that there are at
least theoretical rudiments and some legal solutions possible under
an expanded understanding of the human body. In discussing the
preconditions for the development of the theory of the functional
body on the basis of the common law doctrine, we would, first, note
the following view. One should distinguish the legal status of
separated organs depending on whether the organs are removed
permanently from the person, or whether they are removed
temporarily in order to return them back into the human body. 159
This theory can be successfully used to justify the preservation of
the bodily status of the human organ in spite of its separation from
the body. The same thesis may also be evidenced by a theory, which
would emphasize the importance of the will of a person from whom
organs are removed in order to change the legal status of human

156. But see Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.
957, 959 (1982) (writing that some things are seen by people as “almost part of
themselves”); see also Samual Wheeler, Natural Property Rights as Body Rights,
14 NOUS 171, 181 (1980) (Fr.) and Paul Matthews, The Man of Property, 3 MED.
L. REV. 251, 252 (1995) (writing that “what is Mine is an extension of Me, and
is protected as I am”).
157. Charles Joye, Génome Humain, Droit des Brevets et Droit de la
Personnalité. Étude d'un Conflit 100 (2002) (PhD dissertation) (on file with the
Université de Lausanne); VINCENT CORPATAUX, L'UTILISATION DU SANG À DES
FINS THÉRAPEUTIQUES. ÉTUDE DE DROIT SUISSE DANS UNE PERSPECTIVE
EUROPÉENNE 201 (2012) (Switz.).
158. See REY, supra note 26, at 26 (explaining the concept of single object);
MEIER-HAYOZ, supra note 26, at 70.
159. See Margaret Swain & Randy Marusyk, An Alternative to Property
Rights in Human Tissue, 20 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 12, 13 (1990) (highlighting
this distinction)
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organs to that of an object of property. 160 The functional body
approach can rely not only on a theoretical basis, but also on a
substantial body of case law, which embodies a wider interpretation
of the body.
In support of this paper’s thesis, may be quoted the practice of
criminal and civil battery, which, being inherently an act associated
with the striking of the human body,161 has been given a quite wider
interpretation. Therefore, a person to whom the battery is inflicted
may also enshrine all that is thus connected to the body, which is
generally perceived as part of the person and, consequently, shares
their inviolability, regardless of the weakness or remoteness of the
attachment to the person.162 In Respublica v. Longchamps,163 the
judge acknowledged battery where a victim had his cane dislodged
from his hands, justifying it with the maxim that “[a]nything
attached to the person, partakes of its inviolability.” 164 The phrase
“attached to a person” can mean a variety of things. In Fisher v.
Carrousel Motor Hotel Inc.,165 the court found a battery where a
plate was ripped from a person against his will. 166 Similarly, assault
was found in S. H. Kress Co. v. Brashier,167 in which someone
snatched a book from the victim’s hands. 168 In general, any act of
low impact on the body, such as snatching or pulling an object out
of a person’s hand gives rise to “assault and battery.” 169 This
interpretation of the crime against inviolability and the human
body is popular170 and is a remarkable conquest for the human body

160. See, e.g., JAMES PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 121 (1997)
(requiring not only physical separation, but also the will of the person from
whom the organ is separated to part with the organ for ownership in the
separated organ to occur). See also ROHAN HARDCASTLE, LAW AND THE HUMAN
BODY 151 (2007) (citing James Penner’s THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW).
161. As evidenced by the etymology of the word itself. See Battery Definition
& Meaning, Merriam-Webster, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/battery
[perma.cc/W2MK-GZQ5] (last visited June 1, 2022, 10:52 PM) (providing that
the word battery comes from the Latin battuō [to beat]).
162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 18 (1965) (stating that even
an indirect offensive contact with a person is battery); FOWLER HARPER &
FLEMING JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 216 (1956). See also WILLIAM PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS 32 (3d ed., West Publishing 1964) (holding that an interest in a
person's integrity includes all things attached to or in contact with them).
163. Respublica v. Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784).
164. Id. at 114.
165. Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1967).
166. Id. at 629.
167. S. H. Kress Co. v. Brashier, 50 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
168. Id. at 924.
169. Morgan v. Loyacomo, 190 Miss. 656, 656-7 (Miss. 1941).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Ortega, 27 F. Cas. 359, 360-61 (C.C.E.D Pa.
1825) (holding the seizing of the breast of a coat to be an assault); State v.
Ortega, 827 P.2d 152, 154 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (holding the knocking or taking
of a flashlight from the hand of the officer to be battery); Clark v. State, 746 So.
2d 1237, 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding an intentional strike into the
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(extending its status beyond its natural boundaries). Even in the
presence of such a practice ̶ which testifies unequivocally in favor of
the recognition of functional bodiliness ̶ it is also possible to
encounter decisions that explicitly deny it. For example, in
Kurchner v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,171 a man claimed that
destroyed semen belonging to him was part of his body and the
injury was bodily injury for purposes of obtaining insurance
benefits.172 However, the court held that semen outside the human
body was property but not part of the body, 173 which was the reason
for dismissing the plaintiff's claims.

IV. BODY REVOLUTION: ESTABLISHING A NEW THEORY OF
BODILINESS
Having considered the existing doctrine and practice of the
functional body theory, we cannot help but notice its extreme
narrowness and inability to respond adequately to the full-scale
technological changes that have caused the expansion of the human
body’s borders.174 Taking into account that this theory has not set
as its primary goal the expansion of the body beyond its natural
limits, we are ready to propose a new theory of bodiliness, which is
a more perfect, complete and consistent realization of principles of
autonomy of will and bodily self-determination of the human being.
Thus, it is believed that:

vehicle with driver sitting therein as battery against the driver); Reynolds v.
Macfarlane, 322 P.3d 755, 759 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) (holding the grabbing of ten
dollars from the hand of a person as battery); City of Fort Worth v. Deal, 552
S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex. App. 2018) (holding intentional contact with a vehicle was
actionable as a battery on its driver); United States v. Pruitt, No. 20-6121 (6th
Cir. Jun. 14, 2021) at 18 (holding that the attempt to grab a gun way from an
officer to be a battery).
171. Kurchner v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 858 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2003).
172. Id. at 1221.
173. See id. (“sperm outside of the body is property and is not a part of the
body.”).
174. In a recent article, the author points out the future awaiting humans,
which is that human bodies are gradually becoming connected to (and therefore
dependent on) software, the Internet. For this situation the author suggests a
rather colorful and aphoristic wording - the Internet of Bodies (IoB) - similar to
the Internet of Things (IoT), see Andrea M. Matwyshyn, The Internet of Bodies,
61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 77, 86-87 (2019). The theory this article proposes, by
extending the legal boundaries of the body, allows us to protect Internet devices
and software-enabled storages which are remote directly from the body and
which the body needs to perform its function, as a functional body.
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(1) everything a person is born with, regardless of the
unusualness and irregularity of it, is a human body by
virtue of natural bodiliness;
(2) everything that has been firmly attached to a person by
their will is their body by virtue of the attached bodiliness;
(3) anything that is not firmly attached to the human body,
but either functionally replaces human’s natural or
attached body, or functionally supports that body to the
extent that without that support the relevant part of the
body would not perform its function or would perform it
at a level that substantially reduces the quality of human
life, or brings new bodily functions in addition to the body
by virtue of natural and attached bodiliness, is the human
body by virtue of functional bodiliness;
(4) anything that does not belong to natural, attached, or
functional bodiliness, but has been reserved to perform
the function of the body in the event of the inability to
properly perform the function by what is a body by virtue
of the body of these three bodilinesses, is a body by virtue
of the reserve bodiliness;
(5) anything which was considered a body by virtue of natural,
attached, functional, or reserve bodiliness, but which has
lost a bodily feature apart from the will of person, if that
feature can be restored, is a human body by virtue of
reversible bodiliness.
Every bodiliness, as the basis for why something is recognized,
treated, and protected as a human body, can best be understood by
way of example. The expected and inevitable example of natural
bodiliness is the body with which a person is born. This body, which
a person is endowed with apart from their will, regardless of their
desire, nevertheless, serves as the territory of the realization of
their will, the basis for self-development and self-realization.
Already at the moment of birth, it embodies the individual
characteristics and uniqueness of the person, their value to society
as a whole. Therefore, this body is protected in its entirety, no
matter how abnormal it may appear in the light of the prevailing
social or biological attitudes. What is natural is not abnormal.
In contrast to natural bodiliness, the basis for attached
bodiliness is the will of human as the master of one’s own body.
Examples of this are prostheses and artificial organs that are
inserted into the human body, performing a naturally necessary
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and socially accepted function. As well as things that are attached
to the human body, which do not necessarily have a biologically
significant function, but which modify the body, such as piercings
or aesthetic implants. In attached bodiliness, the reason for
changing proprietary status of an object to bodily is the human
decisiveness to make the object part of oneself, which culminates in
the moment of direct attachment. With the help of the category of
attached bodiliness it is possible to give proper meaning to the will
of the individual, which absolutely dominates over its own nature
embodied in the body, being entitled to change it in any way. 175
Since the attached bodiliness is recognized as equal to any other
bodiliness, the decisions of the individual concerning their body
protected by this bodiliness will bind society as a whole and the
entire legal order,176 characterizing the individual as sovereign of
their body. Figuratively speaking, the emergence of an attached
bodiliness reflects the transition of the legal view of the body from
a constitution of the body to the bodily Constitution approved by the
individual.
Additionally, functional bodiliness is essential in shaping the
new legal status of the body. The most common example of
functional bodiliness is the artificial ventilator. 177 This device,
although not firmly attached to the human body, performs a
respiratory function of the body that is crucial to the maintenance
of life.178 In such cases, the legal mechanism of functional bodiliness

175. When speaking of the right of a human to change their body, it is
impossible not to quote the apt statement of an Italian author who observed
that every human has a potential and an actual body. Stefano Rodotà, Ipotesi
sul Corpo “Giuridificato”, RIV. CRIT. DIR. PRIV. 447, 447 (1994) (It.).
176. An example of how the attachment of a body part can affect the state
and the law as a whole can be seen in a case considered by the ECtHR, which
raised the issue of the artificial vagina of a transgender person being recognized
by criminal law in Britain on an equal footing with the natural vagina for the
purposes of the crime of rape. Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Eur.
Ct. H.R., App. No. 28957/95, §§ 46, 78 (July 11, 2002). The theory of attached
bodiliness that we have created can present a consistent dogmatic rationale for
why transgender persons' decisions regarding their bodies should be protected,
both in cases like the present one and in a host of other cases.
177. On the popularity of ventilators, see Arthur Slutsky, History of
Mechanical Ventilation. From Vesalius to Ventilator-induced Lung Injury, 191
AM. J. OF RESPIRATORY AND CRITICAL CARE MED. 1106, 1107 (2015) (indicating
that mechanical ventilation is “a very common modality” in intensive care
units); David M. Polaner & George Gregory, Respiration — how did we get here?,
32 PEDIATRIC ANESTHESIA 97, 97 (2022) (pointing out that because of the polio
epidemics, the earliest ventilators became widespread in 1940s-50s). See also
Christine Ball & Rodney N. Westhorpe, The Early History of Ventilation, 40
ANESTHESIA AND INTENSIVE CARE 3, 4 (2012) (arguing that the first automated
ventilators became popular at the beginning of the 20th century).
178. Artificial ventilators, similar in principle to today's ventilation systems,
first appeared in the middle of the last century, and since then have saved many
lives. For a detailed history of the emergence and development of ventilator
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allow us to protect the interest in the normal functioning of the
body, which, to compensate its internal natural weaknesses,
acquires an external artificial “organ.” However, the potential of
functional bodiliness is much broader, and it can be applied not only
to cases of replenishing lost or temporarily unused function of the
body, but also to giving the human body a new bodily function not
previously characteristic to the human body.179 In particular, in the
light of the scientific debate on the artificial womb, 180 the functional
bodiliness may act as a propelling locomotive in the legal
qualification of new gynecological inventions. Thus, artificial
wombs, which were previously only a fictitious part of Huxley’s 181
anti-utopia imaginary universe, or the fictional world of The
Matrix,182 have recently become the subject of intense scrutiny by
tech industry giants.183 It is noteworthy that the need to regulate

technology see ROBERT M. KACMAREK ET AL., EGAN'S FUNDAMENTALS OF
RESPIRATORY CARE 1-14 (Elsevier eBook on VitalSource, 12th ed. 2021); Robert
M. Kacmarek, The Mechanical Ventilator: Past, Present, and Future, 56
RESPIRATORY CARE 1170 (2011); Leslie A. Geddes, The History of Artificial
Respiration [Retrospectroscope], 26 ENG. MED. BIO. MAG. 38 (2007).
179. In bioethics there is an emerging field called human enhancement that
explores the implications of improving the natural human body, see Alberto
Giubilini & Sagar Sanyal, Challenging Human Enhancement, in THE ETHICS
OF HUMAN ENHANCEMENT: UNDERSTANDING THE DEBATE 1, 1 (Steve Clarke et
al. eds. 2016) (defining human enhancement as “any kind of genetic, biomedical,
or pharmaceutical intervention aimed at improving human dispositions,
capacities, and well-being, even when there is no pathology to be treated”);
Bjørn Hofmann, Limits to Human Enhancement: Nature, Disease, Therapy or
Betterment?, 18 BMC MED ETHICS 56, 56 (2017). See also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL
ON BIOETHICS, BEYOND THERAPY: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE PURSUIT OF
HAPPINESS 13 (2003) (describing enhancement as “the directed use of
biotechnical power to alter, by direct intervention, […] the ‘normal’ workings of
the human body […], to augment or improve [its] native capacities and
performances”); CHRISTOPHER COENEN ET AL., HUMAN ENHANCEMENT, 6 (2009)
(conducting a study of human enhancement at the request of the European
Parliament, clarify that the purposes of human enhancement is to “improve our
natural abilities […] or to give us characteristics or abilities that no human
being has ever possessed before”).
180. See, e.g., Emily A. Partridge et al., An EXTrauterine Environment for
Neonatal Development: EXTENDING Fetal Physiology Beyond the Womb, 22
SEMINARS IN FETAL & NEONATAL MED. 404, 404 (2017) (considering the
development of innovative reproductive methods and defining artificial womb
as an extrauterine system recreating the intrauterine environment); Elizabeth
Chloe Romanis, Artificial Womb Technology and the Frontiers of Human
Reproduction: Conceptual Differences and Potential Implications, 44 J. MED.
ETHICS 751, 753 (2018) (exploring the ethical and legal implications of new
reproductive technologies and opining that the artificial womb technology
replicates and replaces a biological process of gestation).
181. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 2 (2007).
182. THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999).
183. See Margaret Davis, Artificial Wombs Wanted: Elon Musk, Vitalik
Buterin, Other Crypto Geeks Discuss Population Collapse and Ways of Easing
Burden of Pregnancy, THE SCIENCE TIMES (Jan. 21, 2022), www.sciencetimes.
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this result of inventive labor is not far off, as the first prototypes of
such mechanisms have already been created for the human
foetus,184 having previously been scientifically confirmed in
experiments with animal embryos.185 It is argued that an artificial
womb will enable a child to be born from the zygote stage into a
developed fetus, without using the natural womb. 186 Therefore, the
frontline role of functional bodiliness is to legally justify why a male,
not endowed by nature with the gift of child-bearing, becomes the
holder of a new body part which is not inherent to them according
to the laws of evolutionary development and the theory of human

com/articles/35710/20220121/artificial-wombs-wanted-billionaire-crypto-geeksdiscuss-population-collapse-ways.htm [perma.cc/FDN8-DLBW] (recounting a
discussion between Vitalik Buterin and Sahil Lavingia on the topic of the
artificial womb, with Lavingia writing that investors should think of investing
in technologies to make having kids faster, easier and cheaper such as synthetic
wombs, and Buterin stating that synthetic wombs would remove a high burden
of pregnancy from women).
184. See Jenny Kleeman, ‘Parents Can Look at their Foetus in Real Time’:
Are Artificial Wombs the Future?, THE GUARDIAN (JUNE 27, 2020),
www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2020/jun/27/parents-can-look-foetus-realtime-artificial-wombs-future [perma.cc/5HGY-UVNA] (reporting on the
Philadelphia neonatologists’ prototype of artificial womb for premature babies);
Kayleen Devlin, Film, The World's First Artificial Womb for Humans, BBC
NEWS (OCT. 16, 2019), www.bbc.com/news/av/health-50056405 [perma.cc/
UV8M-2YWK] (describing the Dutch scientists progress in development of an
artificial womb aimed at saving lives of premature babies).
185. See Jessica Hamzelou, Artificial Womb Helps Premature Lamb Fetuses
Grow for 4 Weeks, NEW SCIENTIST (APR. 25, 2017) www.newscientist.com/
article/2128851-artificial-womb-helps-premature-lamb-fetuses-grow-for-4weeks/ [perma.cc/6U3P-VZ3E] (noting the scientific progress as to development
of an artificial womb for premature lambs as equivalent to a human fetus at 24
weeks of gestation); Emily Partridge et al., An Extra-Uterine System to
Physiologically Support the Extreme Premature Lamb, 8 NATURE COMMC’N 1,
2-4 (2017) (describing the exact model of artificial womb used for premature
lambs). For the recent development in the field of animals, see Antonio
Regalado, A Mouse Embryo Has Been Grown in an Artificial Womb – Humans
Could Be Next, MIT TECH. REV. (March 17, 2021) www.technologyreview.com/
2021/03/17/1020969/mouse-embryo-grown-in-a-jar-humans-next/
[perma.cc/6XCL-CN9C] (reporting that Israeli researchers have grown mice in
an artificial womb for as long as 11 or 12 days, about half the animal’s natural
gestation period).
186. See Johanna Eichinger & Tobias Eichinger, Procreation Machines:
Ectogenesis as Reproductive Enhancement, Proper Medicine or a Step towards
Posthumanism?, 34 ETHICS OF ECTOGENESIS 385, 385 (2020) (outlining a
hypothetical scenario of complete ectogenesis by means of an artificial womb);
Elselijn Kingma & Suki Finn, Neonatal Incubator or Artificial Womb?
Distinguishing Ectogestation and Ectogenesis Using the Metaphysics of
Pregnancy, 34 ETHICS OF ECTOGENESIS 354, 355 (2020) (comparing a genuine
artificial womb to the popular concept of growing "babies in bottles"); Carlo
Bulletti et al., The Artificial Womb, 1221 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF
SCIENCES 124, 124 (2011) (depicting an artificial uterus as opening new
perspectives for complete ectogenesis).
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physiology.187 In this context, the adoption of a theory of functional
bodiliness would be in line with the modern trend towards gender
equality, which has become a cornerstone of any democratic
society.188 Specifically, through this theory the male body will
acquire the characteristics that were previously the distinctive
features of the female body.189 The dogma proposed in this paper
will also echo the views of feminism. Well-known feminism theorist
Shulamith Firestone’s prophecies may come true:
“[t]he
reproduction of the species by one sex for the benefit of both would

187. Among mammals, which include humans, biologically male bodies lack
the ability to be pregnant, see, e.g., Kai N. Stölting & Anthony B. Wilson, Male
Pregnancy in Seahorses and Pipefish: Beyond the Mammalian Model, 29
BIOESSAYS 884, 893 (comparing the reproductive systems of mammals and
syngnathids and noting that the latter have acquired “an exceptional
development [of male pregnancy]”); Adam G. Jones & John C. Avise, Male
Pregnancy, 13 CURRENT BIOLOGY 791, 791 (2003) (averring that the “[m]ale
pregnancy is an alien concept to us mammals”). In general, it is extremely
seldom in nature that biologically male bodies are endowed with the ability to
bear children. There are very rare exceptions, see Yan-Hong Zhang et al.,
Comparative Genomics Reveal Shared Genomic Changes in Syngnathid Fishes
and Signatures of Genetic Convergence with Placental Mammals, 7 NAT’L SCI.
REVIEW 964, 965 (2020) (presenting a case of male pregnancy in syngnathids, a
family of fish which includes seahorses, pipefishes, and seadragons); Jamie
Parker et al., Characterization of Pipefish Immune Cell Populations Through
Single-Cell Transcriptomics, 13 FRONTIERS IN IMMUNOLOGY 1, 1 (2022)
(characterizing representatives of the syngnathids as the most morphologically
bizarre fishes, for their unique system of male pregnancy).
188. Leah Rodriguez, US Vice President Kamala Harris Makes History With
UN Gender Equality Speech, Global Citizen (Mar. 17, 2021),
www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/kamala-harris-csw-un-speech-genderequality/ [perma.cc/NN67-XCHA] (discussing US Vice President Kamala
Harris’ UN gender equality speech); Susan Markham, Women as Agents of
Change: Having Voice in Society and Influencing Policy, 5 WORLD DEV. REP. ON
GENDER EQUAL. AND DEV. 1, 1-3 (2013) (considering the World Bank’s policy
regarding the promotion of gender equality); Ronald Inglehart et al., Gender
Equality and Democracy, 1 COMPAR. SOCIO. 321, 321-24 (2002) (explaining the
relationship between gender equality and democratization).
189. On the idea that an artificial womb would help achieve equality
between men and women, see Brit J. Benjamin, Ectogenesis: Is There a
Constitutional Right to Substrate-Independent Wombs?, 20 UNIV. OF MD. L. J.
OF RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 167, 171 (2020); Evie Kendal, The Perfect
Womb: Promoting Equality of (Fetal) Opportunity, 14 BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 185,
185-94 (2017). See also generally Tuija Takala, Human Before Sex? Ectogenesis
as a Way to Equality, in REPROGEN-ETHICS AND THE FUTURE OF GENDER 18795 (Frida Simonstein ed., 2009); EVIE KENDAL, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE
CASE FOR STATE SPONSORED ECTOGENESIS (2015); Anna Smajdor, Defense of
Ectogenesis, 21 CAMB. Q. HEALTH. ETHICS 90 (2012). Cf. Guilia Cavaliere,
Gestation, Equality and Freedom: Ectogenesis as a Political Perspective, 46 J.
MED. ETHICS 76, 80-81 (2020) (pointing to the need for a careful approach to the
artificial womb because access to the latter is limited, and this could cause
further inequality between people who want a child); Elizabeth Romanis,
Partial Ectogenesis: Freedom, Equality, and Political Perspective, 46 J. MED.
ETHICS 89, 90 (2020).
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be replaced by (or at least the option of) artificial reproduction:
children would be born to both sexes equally.” 190 In addition, many
members of the LGBTQ+ community will finally have the cherished
opportunity to have a child of their own without being bound to
resort to surrogate mothers, whose services so far have been a
constant reminder of biological traditionalism, 191 which by its
anachronistic existence has limited the possibility of full cycle
procreation to the need for both male and female participation. 192
The trend towards overcoming biological injustices, by making
corrections through the legal principle of equality, is not limited to
equalizing male and female opportunities for access to the uterus.
Another disadvantage of nature is the impossibility for a
biologically female body to produce spermatozoa and for a
biologically male body, respectively, eggs, with the result that only
male gametes can be recognized as a genuine part of the man’s body
and female gametes as part of the woman’s body. This can be viewed
as pernicious errors of nature; therefore, this paper argues that the
190. SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR
FEMINIST REVOLUTION 12 (1970). See also Loren Cannon, Firestonian Futures
and Trans-Affirming Presents, 31 HYPATIA 229, 236 (2016) (stressing that
Firestone's view is becoming more of a reality considering recent technological
changes); Sarah Franklin, Revisiting Reprotech: Firestone and the Question of
Technology, in FURTHER ADVENTURES OF THE DIALECTIC OF SEX. BREAKING
FEMINIST WAVES 29, 51 (Mandy Merck & Stella Sandford eds., 2010)
(examining Firestone's cited thought and celebrating her contribution to the
tradition of feminism). Contra SARAH BORDEN SHARKEY, AN ARISTOTELIAN
FEMINISM 30 (2016) (suggesting that instead of eliminating biological
differences, cultural conditions and institutional structures should rather be
changed); Anna Watz, Feminisms, in THE YEAR'S WORK IN CRITICAL AND
CULTURAL THEORY 201, 205 (2019) (recalling that the idea of dissociating
reproduction from women’s wombs is “now infamous”); Kathy Rudy, Ethics,
Reproduction, Utopia: Gender and Childbearing in Woman on the Edge of Time
and The Left Hand of Darkness, 9 NWSA J. 22, 30 (1997) (reporting that many
feminists were against ectogenesis in general and Firestone's proposals in
particular).
191. See, e.g., Zairu Nisha, Negotiating ‘Surrogate Mothering’ and Women’s
Freedom, 14 ASIAN BIOETHICS REV., 1, 3 (2022) (asserting that “surrogacy of
any kind […] contribute to the perpetuation of patriarchy”); JESSICA MEGARRY,
THE LIMITATIONS OF SOCIAL MEDIA FEMINISM: NO SPACE OF OUR OWN 56
(2020) (highlighting that surrogacy does not help to combat patriarchal beliefs
and rather reduces women to wombs).
192. See Claire Horn, Wombs in Revolt, AVIDLY (APR. 4, 2018),
www.avidly.lareviewofbooks.org/2018/04/04/artificial-wombs-and-queerfamily-forms/ [perma.cc/4H88-QBYL] (emphasizing the imminent change of
status of historically endangered groups, such as women of color, queer and
trans -men and -women, leading by invention and implementation of artificial
wombs); Aarathi Prasad, How Artificial Wombs Will Change our Ideas of
Gender, Family and Equality, THE GUARDIAN (MAY 1, 2017), www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2017/may/01/artificial-womb-gender-family-equality-lamb
[perma.cc/W65Y-ZP9N] (noting that artificial womb will erase the outdated
inequality between men and women and will reduce prejudice to the same-sex
couples).
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proposed concept of the functional body, as a part of the new theory
of bodiliness, will allow for overcoming the outdated flaws of
evolution. The sharply growing market in both spermatozoa 193 and
eggs194 allows people with biologically male and female bodies to
obtain what they did not previously have by nature – gametes of the
opposite biological sex – and so it is a primary task of the law to
establish proper regulation of the rights of the purchasers of these
reproductive cells.
It is not uncommon to encounter the destructive view that
reproductive cells cannot be owned by acquirers, and this retrograde
position is disguised by the “special nature” of human gametes. 195
Proponents of such an odd theory state that reproductive cells
allegedly may not be property just as human beings may not be
deemed property.196 One can also find opinions full of shallow

193. See Yong Tao et al., Human Sperm Vitrification: The State of the Art,
18 REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY AND ENDOCRINOLOGY 1, 2 (2020) (noting a high
demand for sperm biobanking in artificial reproductive technology clinics). See
contra Nellie Bowles, The Sperm Kings Have a Problem: Too Much Demand,
N.Y. TIMES (JAN. 8, 2021), www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/business/spermdonors-facebook-groups.html [perma.cc/C8R8-M4KU] (highlighting the reduced
supply of donor sperm in coronavirus pandemic and simultaneously increasing
demand for this); Kayla Kibbe, There’s a Pandemic Sperm Shortage, and “Sperm
King” Megadonors Are in High Demand, INSIDE HOOK (JAN. 8, 2021),
www.insidehook.com/daily_brief/news-opinion/pandemic-sperm-shortagedonors [perma.cc/64GF-39PN] (reporting the decreased supply of donor sperm
arising in the period of pandemic).
194. See Emerich Kool et al., Ethics of Oocyte Banking for Third-Party
Assisted Reproduction: A Systematic Review, 24 HUM. REPROD.UPDATE 615, 616
(2018) (describing a dramatic rise in the sphere of ova biobanking). See contra
Pamela Tozzo, Oocyte Biobanks: Old Assumptions and New Challenges, 10
BIOTECH 4, 6 (2021) (mentioning the scarcity of supply in the field of ova
donation); Francoise Shenfield, Cross Border Reproductive Care in Six
European Countries, 25 HUM. REPROD.1361, 1363-64 (2010); Guido Pennings &
Zeynep Gurtin, The Legal and Ethical Regulation of Transnational Donation,
in REPRODUCTIVE DONATION: PRACTICE, POLICY AND BIOETHICS 130, 134
(Michael Richards et al. eds. 2012).
195. See EVA BRITTING, DIE POSTMORTALE INSEMINATION ALS PROBLEM DES
ZIVILRECHTS 67 (1989) (trying to find a unique nature of reproductive cells in
their ability to procreate human life).
196. See, e.g., Arthur Kaufmann, Der Entfesselte Prometheus: Fragen der
Humangenetik und der Fortpflanzungstechnologien aus Rechtlicher Sicht, in
GENFORSCHUNG - FLUCH ODER SEGEN?, INTERDISZIPLINÄRE STELLUNGNAHMEN
259, 264 (Rainer Flöhl ed. 1985) (Ger.). Cf. RALF RÖGER,
VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE PROBLEME MEDIZINISCHER EINFLUSSNAHME AUF
DAS UNGEBORENE MENSCHLICHE LEBEN IM LICHTE DES TECHNISCHEN
FORTSCHRITTS 272-3 (1999) (Ger.) (refusing to recognize the opportunity to
acquire reproductive cells on the grounds that their commercialization would
allegedly cause the commercialization of the product of those cells itself, i.e., the
child); Christian Starck, Die Künstliche Befruchtung beim Menschen Zulässigkeit und Zivilrechtliche Folgen, 1. Teilgutachten: Verfassungsrechtliche
Probleme, Gutachten A, in VERHANDLUNGEN DES SECHSUNDFÜNFZIGSTEN
DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES, at A 17 (Ständige Deputation des Deutschen
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traditionalism that openly disregard the rights of sexual minorities.
For example, in the French case Parpalaix v. CECOS, the
reproductive center’s representative tried to prove that sperm could
not be owned so as to not give them to the cohabitant of the
deceased.197 She stated that if ownership of reproductive cells was
recognized, then transgender and queer couples could then acquire
them for further procreation.198 As can be understood, for her, the
possibility of LGBTQ+ people to procreate is a negative
consequence, as if these people belong to the Nietzschean category
of “Untermenschen,”199 whose reproduction must be prevented. The
French court, however, rejected the arguments of a primitively
binary nature, stressing that the natural necessity of procreation
and the development of the family institution required that in such
a situation the ownership of gametes shall be recognized.200 The

Juristentages ed., 1986) (Ger.) (adopting the same view and arguing that the
admission of the acquisition of reproductive cells is at odds with human dignity).
197. TGI Créteil, 1re ch. civ., Aug. 1, 1984, JCP 1984, II, 20321, note S.
Corone.
198. See Sabine Maubouche, Life After Death; French Woman Wins Sperm
Bank Decision, WASH. POST (AUG. 2, 1984), www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
lifestyle/1984/08/02/life-after-death/54f2b01f-e280-467a-a402-4daa3325b6d3/
[perma.cc/WFE2-H9CP] (quoting the words of CECOS’ representative); Elen
Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, Widow and the Sperm: The Law of PostMortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 231 (1985-1987) (emphasizing that
this outcome was presented as unfavorable and negative by CECOS’
representative).
199. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 191-92 (Walter
Kaufmann trans., 1974) (1887) (mentioning Übermenschen (overmen) and
Untermenschen (undermen)). However, by calling the underman a Nietzschean
term, it does not mean that it was coined by Nietzsche, but only that,
philosophically, it can be fully comprehended in the context of Nietzsche's
concept of the overman (apparently the antonym of the underman). The term
became most infamous in Nazi Germany, where it was used to refer to those
people who were considered inferior by Hitler's authorities. The label was used
both in a racial context (against Jews, Slavs, and other peoples) and in a broader
social context, against any group hated by the Nazis (including homosexuals).
See, e.g., OLIVER RATHKOLB, REVISITING THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST LEGACY:
COMING TO TERMS WITH FORCED LABOR, EXPROPRIATION, COMPENSATION, AND
RESTITUTION 84 (2002) (explaining how the Nazis justified their atrocities
against the Slavs and Jews with the concept of underman); Ina R. Friedman,
The Other Victims of the Nazis, www.socialstudies.org/sites/default/files/
publications/se/5906/590606.html [perma.cc/8H97-Y9HB] (last visited June 1,
2022, 6:42 PM) (elucidating that the Nazis sought to exterminate homosexuals
as “genetically defective” and applied the label of underman to their victims). It
is noteworthy, however, that the Nazis borrowed this term not from Nietzsche’s
texts, but from a book by Lothrop Stoddard, a proponent of white supremacy
and a member of the Ku Klux Klan. See, e.g., Alfred Rosenberg, Der Mythus des
20. Jahrhunderts: Eine Wertung der seelischgeistigen Gestaltungskämpfe
unserer Zeit 214 (1930) (calling the Russian Communists “undermen” and
referring to the book written by Lothrop Stoddard, THE REVOLT AGAINST
CIVILIZATION: THE MENACE OF THE UNDER-MAN (1922)).
200. TGI Créteil, supra note 197.
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court thereby made a decision consistent with the will of the
deceased, who wished to continue his lineage even after his own
death.201 A similar conclusion was reached by a Californian court in
Hecht v. Superior Court, where the partner of a suicidal man was
recognized as having ownership of his reproductive cells in a
cryobank because he had bequeathed them to her.202 Such
judgments, in perspective, also provide an opportunity of creating a
full family with a child for same-sex couples who, in the absence of
the option of acquiring rights to other people’s gametes (in
particular eggs), have been significantly limited in their ability to
create the family composition that they want. 203
These decisions mark a step forward for humanity by
recognizing the ownership of human gametes, but they are still
rendered in a binary way, which deals with the relationship
between a man and a woman of heterosexual orientation. In this
light, two steps forward appear to be a Canadian decision in JCM
v. ANA, in which a lesbian couple purchased sperm from donors,
which both women used for their own fertilization, while depositing
some of the sperm.204 Subsequently, one of the women wanted to
break up and leave for another partner and take the remaining
sperm for her own fertilization, but the former partner demanded
the sperm be destroyed.205 In this case, the court decided that the
sperm became property because the donors decided to sell it, and
therefore, like any other property, the sperm was divided between

201. Id.
202. Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836 (1993).
203. Nowadays, there are various options of procreation for same-sex
couples, see Reproductive Options for Gay Couples and Single Men, CAL. CTR.
FOR REPROD. HEALTH,
www.center4reproduction.com/blog/reproductiveoptions-for-gay-couples-and-single-men [perma.cc/5WLJ-4RET] (last visited
Feb. 20, 2022, 5:45 PM) (mentioning the opportunity for single men and men in
same-sex marriages to have a child through donor eggs and surrogacy); Fertility
Treatment for Lesbian Couples/Same-Sex Female Couples, CCRM FERTILITY,
www.ccrmivf.com/lesbian-couple-family-building/ [perma.cc/U55Q-SGU2] (last
visited Feb. 20, 2022, 5:50 PM) (noting that lesbian women can have children
using donor sperm and intrauterine insemination, or use donor sperm and in
vitro fertilization); see also Stephanie Watson, Same-Sex Couples Face Fertility
Issues When Trying to Conceive, WEBMD (DEC. 16, 2020), www.webmd.com/
infertility-and-reproduction/features/same-sex-couples-pregnancy [perma.cc/
DA6C-R4S4] (reporting that most gay couples use donor eggs and gestational
carrier); Marilynn Marchione, Growing ‘two-mom’ approach to making babies
lets gay couples share biological roles, NBC NEWS (OCT. 16, 2013),
www.nbcnews.com/healthmain/growing-two-mom-approach-making-babieslets-gay-couples-share-8c11400197 [perma.cc/VV6A-5YAG] (describing a “twomom approach” used by female same-sex couples when the egg of first mom is
fertilized with donor sperm and then implanted into the uterus of the second
mom).
204. JCM v. ANA, [2012] BCSC 584 (Can.).
205. Id. at 12.
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the women.206 Due to the odd number of sperm, the woman who
desired fertilization received one more sperm, compensating for its
property value.207 So, the law allows us to protect the interests of
individuals in the possession of gametes of the opposite sex, but we
ask ourselves the question: does this protection ensure the complete
abolition of the natural inequality? Hardly.
Under the earlier German Supreme Court decision, 208 the man
from whom spermatozoa have been separated can claim the
biomaterial as his functional body, but the woman has not been
given such a right. As we can see, the male reproductive cells are
recognized as her property, but not as her body, so inequality,
although in a more subdued form, continues to parasitize this legal
order.
Within the new theory of bodiliness, the perception of the
functional body allows a woman to make male reproductive cells a
part of her own body insofar as she needs them for procreation, i.e.,
for carrying out the natural function of any human body. It is within
this paradigm that human beings can circumvent the natural
impossibility of a body containing equally male and female. Here,
we can get closer to the origins of Plato’s myth of the origin of the
human being, who at their inception contained characteristics of
both sexes, therefore, were able to reproduce themselves (without
the involvement of third parties). 209 In this way, functional
bodiliness can provide equally protected procreative opportunities
to everyone, regardless of their gender or marital status,
contributing, by legal means, to the development of the principle of
equality of the sexes.
It is also hard not to see what impressive potential many
technological innovations would have if the broad definition of
functional bodiliness this paper has presented was applied. This
broad definition allows us to recognize, as a functional body, the
organs and tissues that are new to a particular bodiliness, but which
perform a function that is natural to humans as a species. 210 But
206. Id. at 96.
207. Id.
208. See BGH, 9, supra note 106 (explaining the theory of functional body).
209. See Kenneth James Dover, Aristophanes’ Speech in Plato's Symposium,
86 THE J. OF HELLENIC STUD. 41, 41 (1966) (synopsizing Plato’s myth that once
upon a time, all human beings were double creatures, each with two heads, two
bodies and eight limbs, and then, by the command of Zeus, each double creature
was cut in half). See also Arlene Saxonhouse, The Net of Hephaestus:
Aristophanes’ speech in Plato’s Symposium, 13 INTERPRETATION 15, 21-22
(1985) (asserting that Plato’s myth tells of the perfection of the original people,
who were whole and self-complete, not needing other people for their fullness).
See contra Anthony Hooper, The Greatest Hope of All: Aristophanes on Human
Nature in Plato's Symposium, 63 THE CLASSICAL Q. 567, 576 (2013) (analyzing
Plato’s myth and concluding that deficiency is the salient feature of our
existence).
210. For instance, a man using an artificial womb performs a function that
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functional bodiliness is not limited to this, and, on the contrary, it
considers completely new bodily functions that can arise in human
organs and tissues. Speaking of functional bodiliness in this
direction, for clarity we can give the example of testing a certain
drug by a person only on a part of their body, so that later, in case
the drug passes the test, it can be introduced into the whole body.
In this case, the respective part of the body discovers a new function
necessary for maintaining the life and health of the body, which
previously, due to underdevelopment of science and lack of
understanding of all the possibilities of the body, could not be
effectively activated.
Such an understanding of functional bodiliness can open the
way for recognition of “organoids” as a functional body. 211
Organoids, modeling organs, and, therefore, performing their
functions, are able to participate in the development of a specific
therapy for a patient and in the selection of an effective drug that
can cope with the disease.212 There is no doubt that harm to
specially grown from human cells organoids, taking into account
their functional similarity to human organs, as well as their
importance for conducting qualitative and effective therapy of the
patient, must be qualified as harm to the functional body.213 As long
as the organoid has not been involved for realization of the body
function, it will be considered as a human body by virtue of the
reserve bodiliness. But, organoids are not the only development in
human cell medicine that needs close attention from the legal side.
Another example of scientific progress in the constant and
ongoing struggle against cancer is the so-called CAR T-cells.214 The
is natural to humans as a species, for it is natural to the other biological sex of
humans as a species, the female.
211. See Hans Clevers, Modeling Development and Disease with Organoids,
165 CELL 1586, 1586 (2016) (defining organoids as organ-like structures created
from three-dimensional cell cultures grown from human cells); Mototsugi
Eiraku & Yoshiki Sasai, Self-formation of Layered Neural Structures in Threedimensional Culture of ES Cells, 22 CURRENT OP. IN NEUROBIOLOGY 768, 768
(2012); Michael Cantrell & Calvin Kuo, Organoid Modeling for Cancer Precision
Medicine, 7 GENOME MED. 1, 1-3 (2015).
212. See Marc van de Wetering et al., Prospective Derivation of a Living
Organoid Biobank of Colorectal Cancer Patients, 161 CELL 933 (2015) (proving
that thanks to organoids it is possible to design individualized therapies for
patients with cancer); Madeline Lancaster & Juergen Knoblich, Organogenesis
in a Dish: Modeling Development and Disease Using Organoid Technologies, 345
SCIENCE 283, 283 (2014) (presenting the perspectives of modeling the course of
the disease with the assistance of organoids); Aliya Fatehullah et al., Organoids
as an In Vitro Model of Human Development and Disease, 18 NAT. CELL BIOL.
246, 246 (2016).
213. See Jochen Taupiz, Organoide, 2020 MEDR 805 (Ger.) (describing the
prospects for the use of organoids in medicine and considering issues of
qualification of their legal status).
214. See Kamilla Swiech et al., Front Matter, in CHIMERIC ANTIGEN
RECEPTOR T CELLS: DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION I, V (Kamilla Swiech et
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infusion of CAR T-cells is a rapidly growing type of
immunotherapy215 for cancer often referred to as adoptive cell
transfer.216 This is based on modifying the protective cells of the
human body by giving them the function of recognizing cancer
cells.217 At the present time, due to the imperfection of scientific
advancement, most of these procedures are performed outside the
human body.218 Therefore, the correct qualification of the status of
cells that can save human life from sometimes fatal diseases, before
their reunification with the body of their source, is a matter of
primary importance in the field of medical law. This paper argues
that these cells, being outside the human body, can be regarded as
a reserve body, since they retain a useful function that can be
effectively deployed by reuniting these cells with the human body.
It is with this understanding that the medically and physiologically
important cells would have no lesser legal significance, thereby
providing the utmost protection to human expectations against
juridical neglect and reduction of the reserve parts of the human
body to primitive regime of mere property.
Natural, attached, and functional bodilinesses are organically
supplemented by the last two bodilinesses – reserve and reversible.
The peculiarity of the first three bodies was that they had a physical
(natural and attached bodilinesses) or functional (functional
bodiliness) connection with the body, and therefore, are unable, in
al. eds., 2020) (defining CAR-T cells as T cells that are genetically modified with
synthetic chimeric antigen receptor (CAR)); Anh Nguyen et al., Emerging Novel
Combined CAR-T Cell Therapies, 14 CANCERS 1403, 1403 (2022) (stating that
CAR T-cell therapy entails the engineered modification of autologous T cells to
robust T cells that can initiate anti-tumor reactivity of the target tumor cells);
Luisa Chocarro et al., CAR-T Cells for the Treatment of Lung Cancer, 12 LIFE
561, 562 (2022) (depicting CAR-T cells as T cells that are genetically engineered
to specifically recognize and kill cancer cells through the expression of chimeric
antigen receptors).
215. CAR T-Cell therapy, CANCER RSCH. UK (MAY 20, 2021),
www.cancerresearchuk.org/about-cancer/cancer-in-general/treatment/
immunotherapy/types/CAR-T-cell-therapy [perma.cc/GP8V-CUXC].
216. See CAR T Cells: Engineering Patients’ Immune Cells to Treat Their
Cancers, AM. NAT’L CANCER INSTITUTE (JULY 30, 2019), www.cancer.gov/aboutcancer/treatment/research/car-t-cells [perma.cc/FSM8-MUE9] (characterizing
CAR T-cells therapy as a type of adoptive cell transfer).
217. See CAR T Cell Therapy: Using Immune Cells to Fight Cancer,
ANDERSON CANCER CTR., www.pennmedicine.org/cancer/navigating-cancercare/treatment-types/immunotherapy/what-is-car-t-therapy [perma.cc/5U2W9SQB] (last visited Mar. 3, 2022) (outlining the process of CAR T-cells therapy).
218. Cf. Nanoparticles Create Effective CAR T Cells in Living Mice, AM.
NAT’L CANCER INST. (MAY 25, 2017), www.cancer.gov/news-events/cancercurrents-blog/2017/nanoparticles-engineer-immune-cells
[perma.cc/2QNZX8VM] (reporting cases where nanotechnologies were used to modify cells
without their removal from the body of mice); see also Tyrel Smith et al., In Situ
Programming of Leukaemia-Specific T-cells Using Synthetic DNA Nanocarriers,
12 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 813, 815-20 (2017) (describing the process of
production of CAR T-cells with nanotechnologies inside the human body).
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the absence of any of these connections, to protect human interests.
The latter two, in turn, are autonomous from such connections with
the body, and rely much more heavily on the individual’s will, their
decisions and expectations regarding their body. Thus, reserve
bodiliness protects a person’s interest in future organs and tissues
of their body. Examples include: (1) frozen organs intended for
future transplantation to a specific person, (2) frozen cord blood, (3)
frozen eggs and spermatozoa which a person intends to use in the
future to conceive a child, (4) and artificial devices intended to
replace human organs or tissues (such as a reserve ventilation
machine, a reserve prosthesis, an unused artificial womb). Reserve
bodiliness guarantees effective legal means to protect a person’s
decisions about their future body. Through this, it encourages a
person to take care of the life and health of their body in the future
without worrying about the fact that law will continue to perceive
the reserve body as an ordinary thing, diminishing its objective
significance.
The latter, reversible bodiliness, demonstrates in the clearest
and most tangible way that a person’s control over their body has
no boundaries, especially spatial boundaries. If a person has not
expressed their will to separate their organs or tissues from their
body, they will continue, in spite of their physical separation, legally
to be a person's organs or tissues as long as they retain appropriate
biological, chemical, and physical features. This would allow them
to be assigned to any of the four described bodilinesses, and thus
make them back the human body, regardless of whether they return
to the body as the bodiliness that existed before their physical
separation from the body, or as another bodiliness. A common
example in medical practice where reversible bodiliness can be
applied are severed limbs that can be reunited with the body. If a
finger has been torn off a person, and the finger can be reunited
with the body, it makes no sense to stop considering the finger to be
a human body. To do so would be tantamount to allow, for example,
that an ill-wisher of the victim in question could crush the finger
and claim that they did not cause bodily harm, but only property
damage (or would even argue that the finger is no longer a body, but
has not become property and no harm has been done).
If, in contrast, external influences have made the parts of the
body separated from the person irreversible (for example, if the part
of the body separated apart from the person’s will is completely
burned), then, there is no reasonable ground to continue to extend
to such separated parts the bodily legal regime (including those
transformed into ashes). The separated parts will never again
become useful to the person as their body. In this case, the
separated parts of the body, regardless of the extent to which they
have been processed, would be subject to the abstract ownership
right of the person from whom they were separated, which we have
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already discussed above.219
The flexibility of this paper’s proposed rules of human
bodiliness makes it difficult to incorporate them into the traditional
systematics of the body, which is too rigid and does not allow, in
many cases, for human interests to be considered. One of the main
features of this paper’s theory is that it takes into account that
several persons may have legitimate interests in the same part of
the body at once, and that the interests of each of them will be
recognized by law as bodily interests. So, one and the same part may
belong to two persons concurrently on the basis of bodily interests
of the same kind, such as a ventilator serving several persons
simultaneously220 and being their functional body (this is
particularly true in the light of shortage caused by COVID-19
pandemic).221 Likewise, the same part can be the body of two
different persons based on bodily interests of different kinds, such
as an organ separated from one person apart from their will and
attached to another person being an organ of the former by reason
of reversible bodily interests, and an organ of the latter by reason of
an attached bodily interest. In the cases described, there is a unique

219. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
220. Scientific evidence shows that such use of artificial ventilators is
possible, see Jeremy Beitler et al., Ventilator Sharing During an Acute Shortage
Caused by the COVID-19 Pandemic, 202 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE
MED. 600, 602-03 (2020); Tommaso Tonetti et al., One Ventilator for Two
Patients: Feasibility and Considerations of a Last Resort Solution in Case of
Equipment Shortage, 75 THORAX 517, 517-19 (2020); Richard Branson et al.,
Use of a Single Ventilator to Support 4 Patients: Laboratory Evaluation of a
Limited Concept, 57 RESPIRATORY CARE 399, 400-01 (2012).
221. See Megan Ranney et al., Critical Supply Shortages: The Need for
Ventilators and Personal Protective Equipment During the COVID-19
Pandemic, 382 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. e41 (2020) (concerning the shortage in
America and worldwide); Coronavirus. Pénurie de Respirateurs: Face à une
Forte Demande, l’industrie s’organise, OUEST FRANCE (Mar. 24, 2020),
www.ouest-france.fr/sante/virus/coronavirus/coronavirus-penurie-derespirateurs-face-une-forte-demande-l-industrie-s-organise-6790006 [perma.cc/
DJG2-UFE2] (regarding the shortage in France); Héloïse Archambault, Crainte
d’une Pénurie de Ventilateurs Mécaniques, LE JOURNAL DE MONTREAL (Mar. 13,
2020),
www.journaldemontreal.com/2020/03/13/crainte-dune-penurie-deventilateurs-mecaniques [perma.cc/49Z8-8TND] (considering the shortage in
Italy). See also Melissa Healy, Ventilators for Coronavirus Patients are in Short
Supply. How Scientists Might Pivot, L.A. TIMES (APR. 7, 2020),
www.latimes.com/science/story/2020-04-07/researchers-look-for-ways-todivert-patients-from-ventilators-as-shortage-looms
[perma.cc/UBB9-QXLG]
(reporting the quantity of ill people suffering from coronavirus on America is 31
times higher than the number of existing artificial ventilators); Robert Truog et
al., The Toughest Triage - Allocating Ventilators in a Pandemic, 382 NEW
ENGLAND J. MED. 1973, 1973-5 (2020); see Minnesota Department of Health,
Allocation of Ventilators & Related Scarce Critical Care Resources During the
COVID-19 Pandemic (May 4, 2020), www.health.state.mn.us/communities/ep/
surge/crisis/ventilators.pdf [perma.cc/2M4E-RRMP] (setting out ethical criteria
that should and should not guide decision-making regarding COVID).
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legal phenomenon, the multiplication of bodiliness, which is
peculiar to certain bodily parts by nature, such as the body parts of
conjoined twins.222 At the same time, in respect of the latter case of
reversible and attached bodilinesses existing in parallel, it is
necessary to note an important detail. In contrast to the rights to
these organs as bodily parts, which will be equal for each person in
any case due to the dignity and inviolability of the body of each of
these people, the rights of abstract ownership in this common organ
will be different. Since abstract ownership is independent of
bodiliness,223 if an organ taken apart from the will subsequently
ends up in the body of another person, the abstract ownership of the
person from whom the organ was taken will be preserved. The
rights of the recipient of the organ will differ according to their good
faith. If they are in bad faith, they will not have abstract ownership
of the organ. But if they are in good faith, they will also have
abstract ownership, which, however, will be weaker than that of the
person from whom the organ was originally taken against their will,
due to the rule of prior tempore potior iure [first in time, first in
right].
In summarizing the discussion of the established theory of the
functional body and the new theory of bodiliness, which is intended
to replace the fatal flaws and critical weaknesses of previous
theories, both recognizing and rejecting the functional body, it is
impossible not to note that law, reflecting the established or desired
social order, should not be burdened by norms of the past. These
norms were unfounded even in their day and inspired by the
primitivism of the thinking of lawyers who gave no special
222. In the literature on the legal status of the body of conjoined twins,
unfortunately, the multiplication of bodiliness has never been addressed. Many
scholars are convinced that twins have biologically (and thus legally) separate
bodies, only joined together, see Kenyon Mason, Conjoined Twins: Diagnostic
Conundrum, 5 EDINBURGH L. REV. 226, 229 (2001); Jenny McEvan, Conjoined
Twins: Murder or Mercy, 33 BRACTON L.J. 7, 10 (2001); Lisa Hewitt, A
(Children): Conjoined Twins and Their Medical Treatment, 3 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
207, 208, 218 (2001); Gisela Bockenheimer-Lucius, Siamesische Zwillinge Trennen oder Nicht?, 12 ETHIK MED 223, 224 (2000) (Ger.); Hao-Hao Wu &
Michael Wuschko, Die Trennung Siamesischer Zwillinge, 2016 RESCRIPTUM
110, 110 (Ger.). But see John Harris, Human Beings, Persons and Conjoined
Twins: An Ethical Analysis of the Judgment in Re A, 9 MED. L. REV. 221, 226
(2001) (suggesting that twins have a single biological, and probably legal, body);
Christine Overall, Conjoined Twins, Embodied Personhood, and Surgical
Separation, FEMINIST ETHICS AND SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:
THEORIZING THE NON-IDEAL 78, 79 (Lisa Tessman ed., 2009); Mark Bratton &
Susan Chetwynd, One into Two Will Not Go: Conceptualizing Conjoined Twins,
30 J. MED. ETHICS 279, 280 (2004); Kenneth Himma, Thomson's Violinist and
Conjoined Twins, 8 CAMB. Q. HEALTH. ETHICS 428, 430 (1999). Seemingly, no
one has concluded, which we justify, that conjoined twins, by nature, have a
single biological and physical body, which, at the same time, is two separate
legal bodies (multiplication of bodiliness).
223. See Shevelev & Shevelev, supra note 39.
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importance to the human body and thought it right to regulate
bodily issues by residual principle. Nowadays they appear as an
extremely harmful anachronism, establishing an insurmountable
obstacle to the bodily development of the individual. We are
convinced that the concept of the human body is the cornerstone for
the whole normative body, which is proudly called law. Only then
will law be meaningful and powerful when it recognizes the
meaningfulness and power of the body.

V. BODY REVOLUTION ALSO MEANS GENDER
REVOLUTION: POSITIONING GENDER IN A BODILY
DIMENSION
The new theory of bodiliness entails a radical revision of the
concept of the human body that existed in the past. It allows
equality to be reinforced and achieved in instances in which it
previously seemed impossible. This paper has outlined many
situations, in which a broad understanding of the body can ensure
equality, but this list is not exhaustive. There is one rather
unobvious implication of the new theory of bodiliness, which can be
used to justify dogmatically and unimpeachably why a person’s
decisions about their gender should be binding on society at large.
This implication of the theory we have developed is particularly
salient and appealing in light of the fact that at present, despite
numerous attempts, the legal status of a person's decisions about
their gender has not yet been adequately defined.224 Accordingly,
from a legal perspective, it is not clear why these decisions should
not be respected by the legal system as a courtesy required by the
current trends of the new age, but should be honored by it as binding
and restraining. Before articulating the essence of our proposed
solution, this article will make a brief, but pithy interlude on how
transgender rights are now protected. En passant [incidentally],
this article will explain where the fatal weakness of the existing
regulation lies.

A. Unequal Protection Clause: Destigmatizing
Transgender People
The most likely way to protect the rights of transgender people
is to invoke the Equal Protection Clause (“Clause”),225 which has
224. See, e.g., Karl Gerritse et al., Decision-making Approaches in
Transgender Healthcare: Conceptual Analysis and Ethical Implications, 24
MED., HEALTH CARE, AND PHIL. 687, 689 (2021) (arguing that the genderrelated decision-making is based on the negative obligation of others – not
constraining a person while deciding on their gender).
225. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall [...] deny to any person
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been applied with enviable consistency by the courts. 226 The
criterion for applying this Clause is the state’s exercise of
“intentional and arbitrary discrimination” against a specific class of
people.227 In other words, the Clause shields people from being
subjected to “arbitrary or irrational” distinctions based on “a bare
[...] desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”228 This Clause has
indeed proven to be effective, since it has guided the courts in
granting the claims of transgender persons.229 However, the
application of this Clause is questionable, as it is apparent from the
above definition that it cannot by itself secure respect for a person’s
will and decision regarding their own gender, because it is applied
irrespective of any decisions (including those regarding their own
gender) by the discriminated person. If transgender people as a
class are discriminated against, the protection of a particular
transgender person from discrimination pursuant to this Clause
merely states that they have decided their gender; 230 the Clause
does not indicate that the law respects a transgender person’s
decision. Protection under the Equal Protection Clause is no act of
respecting a transgender person’s decision, but an act of
condemnation of the state’s arbitrariness.
Furthermore, the application of the Equal Protection Clause
stigmatizes transgender persons and cements existing inequalities
because it declares them a separate class, distinct from both men
and women. This directly contradicts the wishes of transgender
persons themselves. For example, if a person who was assigned the
male sex at birth considers themselves a woman, this individual
would obviously want the law to treat them as a woman, not as a

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
226. See generally Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586 (4th
Cir. 2020) (concluding, under Title IX, discrimination against a person for being
transgender or homosexual constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex);
Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty., 968 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding
Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of transgender status); Whitaker
v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1034 (7th Cir.
2017) (holding that under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, a
transgender high school student could not be barred from choosing to use the
bathroom that corresponded with the student’s gender identity).
227. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam)
(quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cty., 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923)).
228. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985)
(quoting U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
229. See Grimm, 972 F.3d (stating that transgender people can use the
bathrooms that match their chosen gender); Adams, 968 F.3d; Whitaker, 858
F.3d.
230. This is if transgender people meet the criterion to belong to an
arbitrarily discriminated class (e.g., arm length); discrimination against
individuals with “long arms” could be deemed a criterion, instead of a decision
about gender.
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transgender woman.231 However, the living law,232 operating
through judges, appears unable to provide respect for a person’s
decision about their gender, and primarily perceives them not as a
person of the appropriate gender, but as transgender.
Consequently, the application of the Equal Protection Clause
paradoxically generates inequality, exposing transgender people to
unequal treatment by the state.
Such a short-sighted approach is fraught with multiple
problems for transgender persons. For example, substantial
barriers are created for transgender women to participate in sports
on teams that match their gender.233 Courts, although favoring
claims of transgender women, still subject them to a fairly onerous
analysis as to whether they have an advantage over people who are
deemed female based on the sex assigned at birth. 234 In essence, the

231. See, e.g., Adams, 968 F.3d at 1292 (quoting Mr. Adams, a transgender
man, who described himself in the following way: "I am a boy [...], I'm just like
every other boy."); see also Frequently Asked Questions about Transgender
People, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., www.transequality.org/issues/
resources/frequently-asked-questions-about-transgender-people
[perma.cc/
B326-3ZKL] (July 9, 2016) (pointing out that “[m]ost transgender people do
have a gender identity that is either male or female, and they should be treated
like any other man or woman”); Katie Alston, The Transgender Arguments
Dividing Society, BBC, (Mar. 5, 2018) www.bbc.com/news/uk-43255878
[perma.cc/45D4-HNLS] (citing a transgender woman who stressed that she was
“as valid a woman as any other woman”); cf. Ryan T. Anderson, Transgender
Ideology Is Riddled With Contradictions. Here Are the Big Ones, THE HERITAGE
FOUND., www.heritage.org/gender/commentary/transgender-ideology-riddledcontradictions-here-are-the-big-ones [perma.cc/WQ99-H2UE] (Feb. 9, 2018)
(clarifying that “[a] transgender boy is a boy, not merely a girl who identifies as
a boy”).
232. EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
493 (Walter L. Moll Trans., Transaction Publishers 2001) (1936) (“The living
law is the law which dominates life itself even though it has not been posited in
legal propositions.”).
233. See Gillian R. Brassil, How Some States Are Moving to Restrict
Transgender Women, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 11, 2021)
www.nytimes.com/
2021/03/11/sports/transgender-athletes-bills.html
[perma.cc/5B22-RNF6]
(describing attempts to limit transgender women’s participation in sports);
Masha Gessen, The Movement to Exclude Trans Girls from Sports, THE NEW
YORKER, (Mar. 27, 2021) www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/themovement-to-exclude-trans-girls-from-sports [perma.cc/GR7U-MFHT]; Susan
Gerb, Discrimination Against Transgender Women in Sports, WASH. POST, (Apr.
25,
2021)
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/letters-to-the-editor/
discrimination-against-transgender-women-in-sports/2021/04/25/412a49d4a20f-11eb-b314-2e993bd83e31_story.html [perma.cc/2L5E-2PHQ].
234. See, e.g., Hecox v. Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930, 982 (D. Idaho 2020)
(observing that “the significant dispute regarding whether [transgender]
athletes actually have physiological advantages over cisgender women […]
suggest[s] the Act” categorical exclusion of transgender women athletes has no
relationship to ensuring equality and opportunities for female athletes”); B. P.
J. v. W. Va State Bd. of Educ., Civil Action 2:21-cv-00316, 1 (S.D.W. Va. Jul. 21,
2021) (applying the standard of physical advantages, and finding that “B.P.J. [a
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very fact that transgender women are confronted with other women
regarding potential discrimination against the latter does genuinely
and actually discriminate against the former. Surely, if transgender
women were truly seen as women, then the courts would not even
consider comparing some women to other women in terms of their
natural abilities, including the notorious testosterone levels235 that
determine physiological advantage (just as it is still of no legal
significance that some men’s testosterone levels may be markedly
and flagrantly higher than others). Accordingly, although in the
cases cited earlier the courts have sided with transgender persons
in applying this discriminatory analysis, nothing rules out the
possibility that a different factual background could lead to a
fundamentally different outcome.236
In the same odious vein of disparate treatment of transgender
people is the Third Circuit’s judgment in Doe v. Boyertown Area
School District,237 in which the court held that the school district’s
policy of permitting transgender students to use bathrooms and
locker rooms that aligned with their gender was lawful. Although
the decision turns out to be in favor of transgender people, the
reasoning employed by the court to justify its decision is
symptomatic. In explaining why the protesters’ claims against the
policy are not based in law, the court asserts that their
“constitutional right to privacy is not absolute,”238 and that this
right must be “weighed against important competing governmental
interests.”239 Namely, it should be balanced against “a compelling
state interest in not discriminating against transgender
students.”240
As with transgender rights in the realm of sports, wisdom
transgender girl] has not undergone and will not undergo endogenous puberty,
the process that most young boys undergo that creates the physical
advantages”).
235. See, e.g., Hecox, 479 F. Supp.3d (addressing the “compelling evidence
that equality in sports is not jeopardized by allowing transgender women who
have suppressed their testosterone for one year to compete on women's teams”).
236. At the present time, more and more American states have adopted bills
of other anti-transgender regulations. See Jo Yurcaba, ‘State of crisis’: Advocates
Warn of ‘Unprecedented’ Wave of Anti-LGBTQ Bills, NBC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2021),
www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/state-crisis-advocates-warn-unprecedentedwave-anti-lgbtq-bills-n1265132 [perma.cc/YGZ3-3YKU] (reporting that in 2021,
eight bills targeting LGBTQ people have become law, most of them centered on
transgender minors). See also Maria Caspani, Factbox: New U.S. State Laws
Directed At Transgender Youth, REUTERS (May 25, 2022), www.reuters.com/
world/us/onslaught-us-laws-targeting-transgender-youth-2022-04-07/
[perma.cc/ZLU8-2A93] (noting that transgender youths are attacked by laws on
school sport bans, and healthcare restrictions, such as banning physicians from
performing “irreversible gender reassignment surgery” on minors and others).
237. Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 2018).
238. Id. at 528.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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cannot help but ask – when a girl who is assigned the female sex
from birth is prohibited from entering a girls’ bathroom, will any
court siding with her weigh the “non-absolute” rights of other girls
against “compelling state interests” in not discriminating against
this girl? This decision is peculiar not only because it presents the
most vulgar inequality in the shadow of equality. It is also
noteworthy because the court chose to balance the privacy rights of
some individuals against the interests of the state and not the rights
of other individuals (transgender people), even though normally
courts should seek to balance precisely the interests of
individuals.241 This primitive approach to protecting the rights of
transgender persons, in which it is not their decisions about their
gender that are binding, but the state's decisions to protect
transgender persons, only diminishes the rights of the latter.
Lastly, in Adams v. School Board of St. Johns County,242 the
Eleventh Circuit dramatically vacated243 its past decision, which
dealt with the Equal Protection Clause.244 In this decision, the court
found a sufficiently simple and evasive way to protect the rights of
a transgender person. The court declared that the plaintiff was
discriminated against, not vis-à-vis cisgender students, but in
comparison to other transgender students in the school district. 245
The court declared that it “offer[s] no opinion on any claims relating
to locker rooms, which [...] would entail a separate analysis of the
means-ends fit in light of the particular interests at stake.” 246
Although the court did not reproduce the analysis given in its
vacated decision, by the very act of acknowledging that this analysis
was necessary, the court again made it abundantly clear that the
last thing it draws strength from for its judgment is an individual’s

241. See NIKOLAY M. KORKUNOV, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW 52 (William G.
Hastings trans. 1922) (pointing out that law is “the delimitation of the interests
of different persons”).
242. Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty, Fla, 3 F.4th 1299 (11th Cir. 2021).
243. The word "vacated” is too neutral and formal to capture how much the
court has repudiated its past decision. In characterizing its past decision, the
court declared that it "[is] no longer in existence" and that "[the majority] never
wrote [it]." Adams, 3 F.4th at 1311. The fact that the majority relinquished its
opinion was also referred to by the dissent. See Id. at 1321 (William Pryor,
dissenting) (noting that "[t]he majority now tacitly concedes that its opinion
could not withstand scrutiny ... [and it] accordingly has withdrawn its earlier
opinion. . .").
244. Adams, 968 F.3d at 1295-304 (examining the matter and concluding
that the transgender person’s rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause
have been violated).
245. Adams, 3 F.4th at 1310-11 (indicating that a school practices
discrimination if it allows transgender individuals (whose genders were
changed on their documents prior to enrollment) to use bathrooms that match
their chosen gender, but at the same time deny this right to transgender
individuals whose gender was changed on their documents after enrollment).
246. Id. at 1313.

2022]

New Theory of Bodiliness

671

decision about their own gender.247 If the court respected a person’s
decision about gender, and considered a transgender man to be as
male, as those whose sex is male by birth, it would never conduct
the infamous means-ends analysis in deciding to admit a
transgender person to the bathroom facility at issue. 248 The court’s
new decision is a perfect illustration of how the mere mention of the
need for special (compared to other people) interest analysis, when
protecting the rights of transgender people, can corrupt an entire
court decision and call into question the principle of equality.

B. Gender Is a Choice - How the Failure to Subjectivize
Gender Drives Discrimination Against Gender-Fluid
People
The prevalent paradigm of the way transgender people are
viewed, in which they are severely discriminated against, is not
exclusively and primarily due to a short-sighted classification of
transgender people. The key premise leading to the inevitable
discrimination is a misunderstanding of a person's gender, and a
failure to realize and accept its subjective nature.
Courts often do not hide that they attach little, if any,
importance to the understanding of gender as a person’s decision.
In Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, the court addressed a
fairly routine case regarding the prohibition of transgender persons
from using sex-segregated bathroom facilities.249 The court,
rejecting the school board’s argument that choice of gender identity
did not cause biological changes in his body, observed that the
school board’s own bias was inherent in this argument, which was
the belief that “gender identity is a choice.” 250 In proffering its
understanding of the world, without even bothering to provide any
substantiation for its position, the court declared that there is a
“medically confirmed [...] gender identity [of a transgender
person],”251 and therefore “being transgender is not a choice, it is as
natural and immutable as being cisgender.” 252 In effect, the court's
decision medicalizes the idea of gender by refusing to view gender
as a person’s decision, since the court likely does not deem a person’s
decision about their gender to be a sufficient basis for rendering a
judgment.
The court’s inclination to interpret gender in medical terms is
quite surprising, given that transgenderism as such is not a medical
247. Id.
248. Id. (implying that the court’s analysis is an integral part of balancing
the rights of transgender and non-transgender students).
249. Grimm, 972 F.3d.
250. Id. at 610.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 612-13.
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condition, unlike gender dysphoria, 253 as the court itself admits,254
and therefore the former does not need to be medically diagnosed or
confirmed. Moreover, it is puzzling as to how a court will medically
establish gender identity if the latter is the fruit of an individual’s
will and self-determination.255 Medicine is incapable, at this stage
of development, of getting inside a person’s head. Its possibilities
are limited to simply reproducing a person’s words about their own
gender, which, however, has little in common with confirmation, let
alone medical confirmation.
Efforts to utilize medical evidence to detect transgender
identity, coupled with a denial of the volitional nature of gender,
can shed light on a theory that is implicitly and perhaps
unconsciously exploited by the court. In the court’s
understanding,256 gender clearly gravitates toward a biologically
and permanently fixed sex, and transgenderism is merely a rebutted
morphological presumption of sex, according to which sex (male or
253. See WORLD PROF'L ASS'N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF
CARE FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDERNONCONFORMING PEOPLE (7th ed. 2021) [hereinafter WPATH, Standards of
Care] (“Only some gender-nonconforming people experience gender dysphoria
at some point in their lives.”). See also Kevin Barry & Jennifer Levi, Blatt v.
Cabela's Retail, Inc., and a New Path for Transgender Rights, 127 Yale L.J. F.
373, 386 (2017) (“Transgender identity is not a medical condition. Gender
dysphoria, on the other hand, is a medical condition; it is real, serious, and
physically incapacitating, and often can only be ameliorated by medical care.”);
Samantha Braver, Circuit Court Dysphoria: The Status of Gender Confirmation
Surgery Requests by Incarcerated Transgender Individuals, 120 Colum. L. Rev.
2235, 2240 (2020) (referring to DSM-5 standards, stating that "it is dysphoria
itself that is the problem - rather than one's identity").
It is worth noting that courts have a deep trust and respect for the WPATH
Standards of Care, see Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 769 (9th Cir. 2019)
(stating, approvingly, that “the WPATH Standards of Care represent[ ] the
consensus of the medical and mental health communities regarding the
appropriate treatment for transgender and gender dysphoric individuals”);
De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 522 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding the WPATH
Standards of Care “generally accepted”); Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d
1164, 1170 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed & remanded, 802 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir.
2015) (explaining that the WPATH Standards of Care “[are] recognized as
authoritative standards of care”); But see Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 221
(5th Cir. 2019) (“the WPATH Standards of Care reflect not consensus, but
merely one side in a sharply contested medical debate.”).
254. Grimm, 972 F.3d at 612 (“[a]lthough some transgender individuals
experience gender dysphoria, and that could cause some level of impairment,
not all transgender persons have gender dysphoria, and gender dysphoria is
treatable.”).
255. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Identities, 3 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 97, 98 (1991)
(emphasizing that gender identity of a person depends upon that person’s selfunderstanding); Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L. J. 2, 31
(2015) (noting that transgender identity might be considered crucial to an
individual’s right to self-definition).
256. See Grimm, 972 F.3d at 613 (rejecting gender's volitional nature and
insisting on its immutability).
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female), until proven otherwise, is determined on the basis of what
genitalia one has at birth. In this context, it is fully understandable
and even sensible for the court to resort to medicine, since otherwise
it is unfeasible to determine a person's gender (by which the court
means their true sex). Just as at birth sex is presumed on the basis
of external traits, the complete and final determination of a person's
sex can only be made by a medical specialist based on the totality of
all circumstances present in the case. In other words, people are
born transgender, being, by virtue of a biological anomaly,
imprisoned in a body whose outward features do not reflect their
natural sex.257 Hence the court's statement that transgender
identity is “natural and immutable.”258
The theory described is extremely hazardous because it places
central importance not on a person’s decision about their gender,
but on certain biological and medical criteria. Thereby, it opens the
way for equating gender with sex and linking the validity of gender
transition to a physiological and anatomical transformation of the
body.259 This will entail imposing on transgender persons expensive

257. Cf. Transgender Youth and Access to Gendered Spaces in Education,
127 HARV. L. REV. 1722, 1741 (2014) (arguing that transgender girls are “girls
born with male bodies”); German Lopez, Why Many Transgender People Feel
They Have to Change Their Bodies, VOX, (June 4, 2015) www.vox.com/2015/6/
4/8728977/transgender-bodies [perma.cc/WYV6-G7CN] (stating that “[m]any
trans people have felt […] that they were born in the wrong body”); cf. also Jisca
Ristori et al., Brain Sex Differences Related to Gender Identity Development:
Genes or Hormones?, 21 INT’L J. MOLECULAR SCI. 2123 (2020) (asserting the
biological nature and premises of gender identity); Aruna Saraswat et al.,
Evidence Supporting the Biologic Nature of Gender Identity, 21 ENDOCRINE
PRAC. 199 (2015).
258. Grimm, 972 F.3d at 612-3.
259. See In re Sex Change of Childers-Gray, No. 20170046, 51 (Utah 2021)
(“[w]e believe that, much like a sex designation made at birth, a change in sex
designation should be accompanied by objective evidence.”); Outlawing Trans
Youth: State Legislatures and the Battle over Gender-Affirming Healthcare for
Minors, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2163, 2172 (2021) (highlighting that the courts have
a more favorable attitude toward trans student’s use of facilities consistent with
their identified gender if they have provided evidence of undergoing genderaffirming medical treatment); Olga Tomchin, Bodies and Bureaucracy: Legal
Sex Classification and Marriage-Based Immigration for Trans People, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 813, 842-43 (2013) (describing and criticizing the way many laws
condition the validity of changing gender upon performing sex reassignment
surgery, which the author denotes as "vague legal fiction"). Some authors do not
consider a person to be truly transgender unless they have undergone sex
reassignment surgery. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Central Mistake of Sex
Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 33 n. 130 (1995) (suggesting that there is a "transgendered woman", who is a
person who was categorized as physically male at birth, yet who regards herself
as emotionally a woman and has undergone surgery to bring her body into
conformity with her gendered identity. Also, claiming that there is a "preoperative transgendered woman", by whom is meant a person who regards
herself as a woman, yet has not undergone sexual transformative surgery).
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and traumatic medical surgeries, which not all transgender persons
are willing to undergo,260 not to mention the financial ability to
afford them.261 In turn, this approach would result in the absolute
exclusion of gender-fluid people from the legal plane, making it
impossible to respect their decision about their gender.
In general, the courts, being affected by the pernicious
influence of the aforesaid theory, have demonstrated their
unwillingness to protect the rights of gender-fluid people. A telling
example of this approach is Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in the
landmark Supreme Court case, Bostock v. Clayton County.262 In that
case, Justice Alito, in criticizing the majority decision, pointed out
that an impermissible corollary would flow from it, according to
which “gender fluid [...] individuals [...] who have not undertaken
any physical transitioning may claim the right to use the bathroom
or locker room assigned to the sex with which the individual
identifies at that particular time.”263 It is hard not to notice that
Justice Alito refuses to recognize the force of a person’s decision
about their gender if it is not corroborated by a physical bodily
change. But it is exactly the case for gender fluid people, who may
perceive their gender differently at various times, 264 which a priori
excludes their ability to change their bodies.
Although courts are reluctant to examine the right of genderfluid people to visit all bathrooms, unless absolutely necessary in
their decisions,265 some courts do express their own views on this

260. See JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF
NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 79 (2011) (reporting
statistics on transgender people not wanting to undergo surgery [with a division
by type of surgery]).
261. See, e.g., SANDY JAMES ET AL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S.
TRANSGENDER SURVEY 140 (2016) (reporting statistics according to which
almost a third of transgender people live in poverty, and the unemployment rate
among transgender people is 15%, three times higher than the average in
America).
262. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
263. Id. at 1779.
264. See Lisa M. Diamond, Gender Fluidity and Nonbinary Gender Identities
Among Children and Adolescents, 14 CHILD. DEV. PERSPECT. 110, 110 (2020)
(noting that gender-fluid people view their own gender as fluid over time); John
Sumerau, Foreclosing Fluidity at the Intersection of Gender and Sexual
Normativities, 43 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 205, 206 (2020) (defining gender
fluidity as the experience of one’s own gender changing over the life course); Nat
Thorne et al., The Terminology of Identities Between, Outside and Beyond the
Gender Binary – A Systematic Review, 20 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 138, 144
(2019) (defining gender-fluid people as individuals who experience their gender
as changing over time); cf. Surya Monro, Non-Binary and Genderqueer: An
Overview of the Field, 20 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 126, 126 (2019) (defining a
non-binary individual as including a person who can experience both male and
female, at different times).
265. See, e.g., Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 654 n.40 (M.D.N.C.
2016) (underscoring that “[the issue of whether the individual transgender has]
THE
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issue in the obiter dictum, which, regrettably, have nothing in
common with respect for the rights of these people. One of the
mildest forms of neglect of the choice of gender-fluid people is found
in Adams v. School Board of St. Johns County.266 There the court
dismissed the School Board’s concern that allowing Mr. Adams, a
transgender student, to use the boys’ restroom could allow a nontransgender student to pose as a gender-fluid student to access the
bathroom.267 The judges specifically emphasized that the School
Board offers no evidence that any students claiming to be genderfluid have asked for access to all bathroom facilities, and therefore
the court “remain[s] unpersuaded that this concern is anything
more than hypothetical.”268 Strictly speaking, the court, in finding
this concern to be “hypothetical,” expressly suggested that it must
be taken precisely as a concern, thereby displaying its prejudice. 269
The court, while ruling in favor of the transgender person, still
distinguished between gender-fluid people and other transgender
people, assuming that the former should not be protected to the
same extent as the latter. The court thereby reveals that a person’s
decision and choice about their gender are irrelevant to it. If a
person’s decision about their gender mattered, it would be the same
for both gender-fluid people and other transgender people, except
that the latter may have sole decision, while the former may have a
divergent decision every day. However, this is all without ceasing to
be sincere and honest, which would reflect an actual understanding
of themselves.
In Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District,270 the Seventh
Circuit, while downplaying the pivotal and cardinal importance of a
person’s decision about their gender, was even more candid than the
court in Adams. The court stated that the School District’s
argument that a transgender person may not “unilaterally declare”
his gender “misrepresents [transgender student’s] claims and
dismisses his transgender status,” because the case at hand is not
one in which a person “merely announced that he is a different
gender.”271 In seeking to distinguish the circumstances of this case
from the example set forth by the School District, which was
vehemently opposed by the court, the court called attention to the
fact that in this case the transgender individual “has a medically

an unqualified right to use all multiple occupancy bathrooms, showers, and
changing rooms under all circumstances […] is not currently before the court”).
266. Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty., 968 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir.
2020).
267. Id. at 1303.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d
1034 (7th Cir. 2017).
271. Id. at 1050.
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diagnosed and documented condition,” 272 and his decision to live “in
accordance with his gender identity [...] was not without cost or
pain.”273 Hardly did the court, which so industriously concentrated
on the medical diagnosis and the hardships associated with a
decision about one’s gender, well understand that in a normal
society where there is no discrimination against transgender
persons and where decisions about one’s gender are respected, such
decisions should by definition not entail pain and suffering. They
will not always be framed as a medical diagnosis, since the
discomfort and stresses transgender persons experience are the
product of their stigmatization in society. 274 On the contrary, in a
normal and exemplary society, in which no crusades against
transgender persons will be organized, the decision about gender
will be “unilaterally declared” and “merely announced,” and no one
will require a person to undergo ordeals and suffering in order to
vindicate respect for their decision.
Undoubtedly, the court decisions described above cannot be
found to be deliberate and conscious attacks on transgender
persons, in general, and gender-fluid persons, in particular. This is
because the courts are guided by undeniably valid goals, such as
protecting privacy, but the means are inadequate to the goals they
seek to achieve. For example, in Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch.
District275 the court granted a transgender person’s request for
access to a bathroom that conformed to their gender. At the same
time, it sought to protect itself from reproaches that its decision
would cause an outbreak of imposters who abuse their right to
determine their gender and declare themselves transgender for
nefarious and immoral purposes. For the sake of safeguarding
society from such people, the court ruled that a “one-off, episodic
declaration of transgender status [...] would not support a factual
finding of transgender ‘gender identity.’”276 The court added that
“[f]or an ‘imposter’ to take such steps [such as the person in the case
did in order to be recognized as transgender] would be an extensive
social and medical undertaking.”277 However, by imposing an

272. Id.
273. Id.
274. WPATH, Standards of Care, supra note 253, at 4 (writing that the
stigmatization of transgender people causes psychological distress, anxiety and
depression, as well as a unique minority stress). See generally Ilan Meyer,
Prejudice as Stress: Conceptual and Measurement Problems, 93 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 262, 262 (2003) (describing details of minority stress); Ilan Meyer,
Prejudice, Social Stress, and Mental Health in Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual
Populations: Conceptual Issues and Research Evidence, 129 PSYCH. BULL. 674
(2003).
275. Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267 (W.D. Pa.
2017).
276. Id. at 291.
277. Id.
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obligation of social and especially medical transition, and by
enjoining a person from understanding their gender differently at
different points in their life, the court irreparably and unreasonably
restricts the rights of transgender persons.278 Its actions are like a
blanket ban on the use of knives just because they may be used to
kill. Rather than erecting high, and for gender-fluid people
insurmountable, barriers, it would be far fairer to acknowledge a
person’s unconditional right to make decisions about their own
gender, with the ability to demonstrate and punish wrongdoers who
abuse that right.279 In this way, there would be no necessity to
assimilate gender in its immutability to sex, or to belittle the
significance of a person’s will regarding their gender.

C. Decisions about Gender as Acts of Bodily SelfDetermination - Protecting Gender as Attached
Bodiliness
As noted earlier, efforts made in practice to explain the nature
of gender and to secure a person’s decision about their own gender
have been unsuccessful. None of the legal paradigms previously
discussed could guarantee free decision-making about one’s gender,
which would be accepted by the courts and would bind the state and
society in the same fashion that, for example, one’s sex binds them.
This woeful situation has a rather simple explanation – in the
absence of a coherent dogmatic approach, 280 which is logical and
broad enough to protect any decision on gender, the courts have

278. Id.
279. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Boyertown Area School District, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 2058, 2063 (2019) (detailing that “if a self-determination policy allows
one student to violate another’s privacy, the school district should punish the
offending student rather than preemptively placing the burden on transgender
students to show that they will not violate other students’ privacy rights”).
280. By and large, current approaches to gender are ad hoc, emerging to
address specific problems, and they have not articulated a general answer as to
what gender is in the legal sense. It is noteworthy that there have been some
timid efforts in the literature to provide a dogmatic explanation of gender in a
proprietary prism, through the concept of property, see generally Davina Cooper
and Flora Renz, If the State Decertified Gender, What Might Happen to Its
Meaning and Value?, 43 J. L. & SOCIETY 483 (2016); Sonia K. Katyal, The
Numerus Clausus of Sex, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 389 (2017) (hereinafter Katyal). See
also Jessica A. Clarke, Adverse Possession of Identity: Radical Theory,
Conventional Practice, 84 OREGON L. REV. 563, 644 (2005) (applying the
doctrine of adverse possession to gender identity).
However, strictly speaking, these studies, despite their curious formulation
of the problem, do not contribute to dogmatic clarity of the legal status of gender,
as they merely draw analogies and leave open the basic question of the status
of gender, see, e.g., Katyal at 399-400 (warning that she would draw "analogies"
between property and gender and suggesting a "metaphorical
reconceptualization of gender regulation").
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been forced to resort to other, narrower and more limited, but
familiar approaches. The latter were oriented not toward a decision
about gender, but toward something extraneous and alien to it,
inevitably replacing the will and decisiveness of the individual with
a set of external, purely contingent circumstances.
Answers to questions about the dogmatic essence of gender
should be pursued, paradoxically, in the bodily dimension. The new
theory of bodiliness, and the concept of attached bodiliness, can
provide a clear and internally consistent explanation of what the
nature of gender is and why the legal system must respect a
person’s decision about their gender. Thus, it is correct to protect
these decisions as acts of bodily self-determination, and the change
in gender itself as an artificial body part by virtue of attached
bodiliness. This thesis is most readily applicable to cases of
transgender persons undergoing sex reassignment therapy, since in
such a case their decision to change their bodies would be externally
implemented through appropriate medical procedures, and the body
parts affected by these treatments would be deemed artificial.
However, the decision to change one’s gender, irrespective of one’s
willingness to undergo medical intervention, is in essence a real
bodily change in the legal dimension. This is true because as long
as law has not abandoned the paradigm of sex division, where the
assignment of a person to a particular sex is material, a person and
their body will always be viewed through a gender prism, in which
the body of any person will be the body of a particular gender.281
Therefore, the decision to change one’s gender will directly change
the legal characteristics of one’s body, and in this sense the change
in gender can be called an artificial body part. This article names it
artificial, since it is not conditioned by birth, but by the decision of
a person who is the master of their body and creator of their destiny,
and part, since the human body, considered as a whole, is not
exhausted by the gender, and thus gender is a legal part of the
human body. Consequently, the legal order, and all its participants,
would have to respect a person’s decision about their own gender no
less than they would have to acknowledge a prosthesis or implant
inserted into a person's body – with all the legal consequences in the
civil, criminal and other domains of law - as part of the human body.
Treating gender as part of the human body by virtue of an
attached bodiliness is not only dogmatically sound, but also effective
in practical terms, allowing for a hitherto unprecedented level of
equality in the field of gender identity. Previously the courts linked
the recognition of a person’s decision about their gender to physical
bodily transformations (both in the form of hormone therapy and
surgery). But now, since gender is inextricably linked to the body,

281. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 172-73 (1999) (arguing
that our bodies are characterized by gender and calling them "gendered").
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being its legal part, the very fact of changing gender will already be
a change of body, and the meaning formerly attributed to sex
reassignment surgery and similar procedures will ultimately belong
to the pure and free decision to change gender.
Moreover, giving gender decisions the meaning of acts of bodily
self-determination would, for the first time, destigmatize
transgender persons in the eyes of the law, making it possible to
protect gender decisions on the basis of an ideologically neutral
concept of bodiliness. Concurrently, it will avoid the need to resort
to the Equal Protection Clause analysis of transgender rights,
which invariably creates a labelling and ostracization of
transgender people. Ultimately, the new theory of bodiliness brings
gender-fluid people out of the shadows, making it possible to justify
why any person's decisions about their gender, regardless of their
fluidity and periodicity, has exceptional legal value and cannot be
trampled upon or disregarded.
A clear and unambiguous individual’s legal status is the
guaranteed and inalienable level of legal certainty that everyone
deserves. Transgender persons do not want what the courts are now
prepared to offer them – a shaky and amorphous legal status,
determined case-by-case on the basis of the arbitrariness of
individual judges.282 By developing a clear, accessible, and noncontradictory explanation of the nature of a person's decisions about
their gender, the new theory of bodiliness is a major step forward in
providing legal certainty and predictability for transgender people
that was previously available to all but them. Thus, the new theory
of bodiliness can make its small but crucial and unique contribution
to promoting equality, achieving diversity, and respecting
individual choice.

VI. CONCLUSION
The conclusions reached by the authors of this article are
discouraging for the predominant view of human rights in relation
to one’s own body and the parts separated from it. In the current
paradigm, irrespective of which concept of regulation of rights to the
282. See Doe, 897 F.3d at 524 (endorsing and adopting a case-by-case
analysis regarding transgender people's right to access bathrooms conforming
to their gender); Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293,
1326 (M.D. Fla. 2018); A.H. v. Minersville Area Sch. Dist., 408 F. Supp. 3d 536,
572 n.18 (M.D. Pa. 2019); Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 654
(M.D.N.C. 2016); N.H. v. Anoka-Hennepin Sch. Dist. No. 11, 950 N.W.2d 553,
572 (Minn. Ct. App. 2020). This practice of restricting basic rights of
transgender people is a telling example of the general politics of eradication
directed against the LGBTQ+ community, specifically, transgender individuals,
see Nancy J. Knauer, The Politics of Eradication and the Future of LGBT Rights,
21 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 615, 620-22 (2020) (describing how exactly the politics
of eradication affects transgender people).
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body is chosen by researchers, the individual has an offensively
small range of rights in relation to their own body. Additionally,
they are forced to share these rights with third parties, society and
the state, which, under current law, may also have protectable and
legitimate interests in the individual`s body. Moreover, existing
law, in determining what constitutes the human body, is guided by
a myopic naturalistic view of the body, refusing to recognize the
human will as the decisive factor constituting bodily status, and
condemning the individual to bodily fatalism, an unjustified
dependence on external influences in determining what should be
considered the human body. We believe that law which deprives a
person of the right to freely dispose of their own body and its
detached parts in any manner whatsoever passes sentence on itself
by its own restrictive laws, vividly demonstrating its inferiority and
incapacity.
The only thing that gives the authors hope, despite the
objectively bleak situation, is that it is possible to change the
situation described. Moreover, existing theories and even judicial
decisions have made the first steps, small and insufficient though
they may be, that are courageous and worthy of respect and support,
toward abandoning the false view that legitimizes the estrangement
of the individual from their body. The emancipation of the human
body is the condition without which social justice and a society in
which self-determination and respect for everyone's opinion are
practical principles, not empty and useless slogans, cannot be
achieved. The new theory of bodiliness that we have developed, as
well as the theory of abstract property rights of the human being in
the body and its detached parts, allow for a fundamentally different
level of self-determination and freedom in relation to one’s own
body, and thus constitute a body revolution that overthrows the
former legal regime which jealously guarded its illegally
appropriated privilege of exploiting the body of human against one’s
own will.
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